# \*\*\*\*\*AI Interoperability Negative\*\*\*\*\*

# Case Advantage Answers

## AI Leadership Advantage Answers

### 1NC — AI Leadership Advantage

#### 1. Allied governments will win the tech race—they have the culture of innovation on their side.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/ 2020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/%202020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html))

But before we get to commercialisation, we need to create the direction of what it is we wish to see commercialised. Technological disruptive innovation does not just happen. It starts with a mission-oriented vision, where measuring risk is impossible and only uncertainty reigns. It requires bold moves that will signpost the future; the confidence to place big bets on technology not yet invented; and an ability to pick winners – all of which must be underpinned by persistent engagement, encouragement and enlightenment. Since the end of the Second World War, only one entity has taken-on such uncertainty: Allied governments (see image below).

#### 2. AI technologies are not key to military power.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from <https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>)

Emerging technologies primarily shape the balance of power through military and economic means.37 Technologies can directly influence countries’ abilities to fight and win wars. They can also indirectly affect the balance of power by impacting a country’s economic power. After all, countries cannot maintain military superiority over the medium to long term without an underlying economic basis for that power.38 Recall the decline of the Ottoman Empire or Imperial China. However, it is not yet clear how the invention of specific AI applications will translate into military power. Despite continuing investment, efforts to integrate AI technologies into militaries have been limited.39 Project Maven is the first activity of an “Algorithmic Warfare” initiative in the U.S. military designed to harness the potential of AI and translate it into usable military capabilities. Still, many investments in the United States and elsewhere are in early stages. As Missy L. Cummings writes: Autonomous ground vehicles such as tanks and transport vehicles are in development worldwide, as are autonomous underwater vehicles. In almost all cases, however, the agencies developing these technologies are struggling to make the leap from development to operational implementation.40

#### 3. Chinese leadership allows for world peace and the solution to a host of international problems.

Global Times, 2021 CHINA WINS INCREASING SUPPORT AT UN DURING 50 YRS, OPPOSING UNILATERALISM, PROTECTIONISM AND HEGEMONY. Oct. 22, 2021. Retrieved May 5, 2022 from <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1237051.shtml>

Over the past 50 years, China has firmly upheld world peace and security. China has been committed to an objective and just position, to resolving differences through dialogue and consultations, and to the principle of non-interference in each others' internal affairs. China firmly opposes the willful threat or use of force in international affairs, the paper said. China has also made vigorous efforts to promote global development, and has met the poverty eradication target of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 10 years ahead of schedule. China has firmly upheld the international order underpinned by international law, and fully supported the UN in playing a central role in international affairs. On October 25, 1971, the 26th UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 with an overwhelming majority of votes, restoring all the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China at the UN and recognizing the representatives of its government as the only legitimate representative of China at the UN. China will organize a conference marking the 50th anniversary of the restoration of its lawful seat in the UN in Beijing on Monday, and President Xi Jinping will attend the conference and deliver important remarks. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, foreign diplomats and representatives of international organizations will also attend the conference on site or via video, Zhao Lijian, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said at Friday's media briefing. The past 50 years were the golden 50 years for close coordination and cooperation between China and the UN which has not only smoothened relations between China and other countries, but also enhanced the authority of the UN which has been undermined by the US' Cold War mentality and hegemony, analysts said. Chinese analysts said that China's international reputation as well as the UN's reputation in resolving international disputes were enhanced with deepened cooperation between China and UN, and China's concept of seeking cooperation, upholding multilateralism and acting as a responsible major country has enabled the UN to take more initiative and show more inclusiveness in dealing with global issues of security, climate change, and health.

#### 4. LIO doesn’t cause peace, other factors explain peace, not LIO.

Charles L. Glaser, 4/1/2019 (professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict, “A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided,” <https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/43/4/51/12223/A-Flawed-Framework-Why-the-Liberal-International>, Retrieved 9/19/2021)

However, while the causes of Cold War peace and the end of the Cold War have fueled much debate and generated many competing explanations, the LIO is rarely among them.80 Effective balancing by U.S. alliances, deterrence supported by nuclear weapons, and bipolarity are much more prominent explanations for the Cold War peace. The economic effectiveness of capitalism relative to Soviet communism, the overwhelming and increasing power advantage that the West enjoyed by the 1980s, and the spread of ideas about security requirements and cooperation are commonly identified as contributing to the end of the Cold War.81 If these factors are key, then there is little left for the LIO concept to explain.

#### 5. Nationalism prevents China from playing a leading role in the international world order.

James Andrew Lewis, 11/30/2018 (Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program, “Technological Competition and China,” [https://www.csis.org/ analysis/technological-competition-and-china](https://www.csis.org/%20analysis/technological-competition-and-china), Retrieved 8/11/2021)

U.S. difficulties in governance and in developing a new model for innovation do not automatically cede leadership to China. Inherent tensions in Chinese policy make China’s desire for a leading role in the international order more complicated and problematic. China is in the Western world, but not of it, meaning its leaders reject the values and beliefs that underpin global institutions when these are contrary to the ruling party’s interests. There are, of course, tensions within Chinese politics over national versus international practice, but the ruling party’s political circumstances incline it toward a nationalism as a source of legitimacy. This emphasis on nationalism creates complications if China seeks to play a guiding role on the world stage.

#### 6. US & China won’t go to nuclear conflict.

James Andrew Lewis, 11/30/2018 (Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program, “Technological Competition and China,” [https://www.csis.org/ analysis/technological-competition-and-china](https://www.csis.org/%20analysis/technological-competition-and-china), Retrieved 8/11/2021)

One touchstone for understanding this contest is the ruling party’s strong desire to avoid the fate of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. The Chinese diagnosis of the Soviet collapse blames the problems created by corruption, exposure to damaging Western ideas, and by Soviet efforts to match U.S. military spending. However, this diagnosis begs the question of whether the Soviet system was fundamentally flawed and unsustainable and whether any system derived from the Soviet model, no matter how attenuated the connection, can be sustained. We can dismiss the idea of a “Thucydides trap.” It is not China’s rise that creates tensions, but the means China has used to achieve this rise. Putting asides its idiosyncratic interpretation of the Peloponnesian War, both China and the United States will seek to avoid damaging and risky military conflict. The advent of nuclear weapons imposes a degree of caution on even the most overconfident leaders when it comes to military adventures. Clashes at the margins similar to border fights with India and Russia might occur, but even low-level clashes hold considerable risk of escalation that will restrain both countries. Conflict and competition today will take new forms, and these new forms of conflict are redefining U.S.-China relations.

### Extensions #1: Allies Will Win the Tech Race Extensions

#### Allied open democracies are better for innovation than other forms of government.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/ 2020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/%202020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html))

The reason is simple: the competition and creativity generated by start-ups is good for the Allied defence ecosystem. Allied open democracies and open educational models bring about levels of creativity which other forms of government are unable to do. This maximises disruptive innovation efforts and, as such, forces incumbents (large companies) to compete with new, fresh thinking – it builds resilience.

#### NATO’s innovation fund solves the AFF.

Vivienne Machi, 11/3/2021 (reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, “NATO ups the ante on disruptive tech, artificial intelligence,” <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/03/nato-ups-the-ante-on-disruptive-tech-artificial-intelligence/>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

STUTTGART, Germany — NATO has officially kicked off two new efforts meant to help the alliance invest in critical next-generation technologies and avoid capability gaps between its member nations. For months, officials have set the ground stage to launch a new Defense Innovator Accelerator — nicknamed DIANA — and establish an innovation fund to support private companies developing dual-use technologies. Both of those measures were formally agreed upon during NATO’s meeting of defense ministers last month in Brussels, said Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. Allies signed the agreement to establish the NATO Innovation Fund and launch DIANA on Oct. 22, the final day of the two-day conference, Stoltenberg said in a media briefing that day. He expects the fund to invest €1 billion (U.S. $1.16 billion) into companies and academic partners working on emerging and disruptive technologies. “New technologies are reshaping our world and our security,” Stoltenberg said. “NATO’s new innovation fund will ensure allies do not miss out on the latest technology and capabilities that will be critical to our security.” “We need to ensure that allies are able to operate the different technologies seamlessly, between their forces, and with each other,” he added. Seventeen allied countries agreed to help launch the innovation fund. They include: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

#### The US leads in the AI tech race now.

Neil Savage, 12/9/2020 (Neil Savage is a science writer based in Lowell, Massachusetts, “The race to the top among the world’s leaders in artificial intelligence,” <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03409-8>, Retrieved 8/20/2021)

As nations vie for leadership, AI research output is increasing rapidly. According to our analysis of journal publications and conference papers tracked by the Dimensions database, the global output for AI research grew from just over 52,000 globally in 2000 to roughly 403,000 in 2019, representing an increase of more than 600%. Now the most popular specialization among computer-science PhD students in North America, AI is set to continue its steep, upward trajectory. Rising revenues The United States has historically been the leader in AI-related research output, having accumulated the highest number of publications over the past two decades. But China has ramped up its output in recent years. In each year from 2016 to 2019, China produced more AI-related papers than any other nation, according to Dimensions. Over this period, China’s output of AI-related research increased by just over 120%, whereas output in the US increased by almost 70%. In 2019, China published 102,161 AI-related papers, and the US published 74,386. India, which came in third, published 23,398. Publication numbers aren’t the whole story, says Jeffrey Ding, a PhD student at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, UK, who studies China’s AI strategy. In the AI Index Report, which uses citation numbers to measure the quality of AI papers, papers from China were cited about 20% less than the world average in 2019, whereas papers from the US were cited about 40% more than average. “Just pumping out raw numbers of papers that don’t have a lasting impact isn’t really useful,” says Ding. “It’s more important to keep up with the technology frontier.” A Nature Index analysis for this supplement looked at the number of AI-related articles published in the 82 high-quality natural-science journals tracked by the index, which primarily concern the application of AI to research in the broad fields of chemistry, the physical sciences, life sciences, and Earth and environmental sciences. Between 2015 and 2019, the US was the leader, with the UK, Germany and China in second, third and fourth place, respectively. But China has increased its output in journals tracked by the index. Although it was the fourth-most prolific country in the index in 2015, with roughly half as many AI-related papers as Germany, China crept up over the next three years, then leapt to second place in 2019, showing an increase of 340%. The US, UK and Germany slightly more than doubled their output over the same period. For the near future, Ding says, the US is likely to remain the world leader in AI. “Though China has some exceptional universities, such as Tsinghua University, the US dominates in terms of maybe the top 20 universities doing AI research, and that is reflected in the quality of the papers. It’s very unlikely that China will become the singular innovation centre by 2030.” Many countries see AI as providing a competitive edge, not only economically, but militarily, says Husain. He likens the competition in AI to the Space Race of the mid-twentieth century, in which the US and the Soviet Union vied to be the first to achieve milestones in space travel. “The Space Race yielded contributions that differentiated the American technological ecosystem from all others for decades to come,” says Husain. “If a country invests heavily in this area, it will yield technologies that will form the pillar of defence capability and economic differentiation for the rest of the century.” Technologies that can be developed based on AI will indeed have both economic and military benefit, says Daniel Araya, a policy analyst at the Center for International Governance Innovation, a think tank in Ontario, Canada. “We’re talking new weapons, data-driven innovation for industry and automation, and redesigning how our society works from the ground up.” Husain points to Germany, which maintains a strong economy that relies on exports of products such as machine parts and automobiles, even though lower-income countries can provide low-wage labour for manufacturing. Germany has been able to compete by using automation to keep manufacturing costs down, while keeping quality and productivity high. AI could reinforce this advantage by powering the next generation of automation technologies. “Anybody that has mastery over this technology and is investing in implementing it retains an economic lead,” says Husain. Institutions in Germany, such as the Fraunhofer Society, Europe’s largest application-oriented research organization, have been emphasizing Industry 4.0, a national strategic initiative from the German government to introduce more digital innovation and advanced robotics into manufacturing and supply-chain management. In China, the ability offered by AI systems to monitor public spaces and scan Internet traffic in an effort to glean user intentions may provide the state with improved tools for social control, enhancing its capability for monitoring the population or censoring information. Even in countries that don’t officially track their populaces, facial-recognition technology, such as that produced by New York-based company, Clearview AI, is being used by law enforcement to identify suspects. The technology has been met with deep concern by some researchers, who say that biases built into its algorithms could result in ethical and human rights abuses. Amid the controversy that surrounds certain applications of AI, some groups are highlighting the good it can do. In 2019, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, a scientific society in Menlo Park, California, launched its Artificial Intelligence for the Benefit of Humanity award, a US$1-million prize funded by Squirrel AI, an education technology company based in Shanghai, China. The inaugural winner, Regina Barzilay from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, received the award in September 2020 for developing a machine-learning algorithm that can examine mammograms and predict which women are at a higher risk of breast cancer. Barzilay has also developed a pattern-recognition algorithm that predicts which molecules might make good candidates for new medications. Publishing in the journal Cell, Barzilay and her colleagues described how their system identified a molecule, dubbed halicin, as a potentially potent new antibiotic (J. M. Stokes et al. Cell 180, 688–702; 2020). When the molecule was synthesized and tested, it was found to kill antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Barzilay continues to work on halicin and hopes to progress it to clinical trials. Money to spend With an eye to the potential benefits of AI-based technologies, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) announced in August 2020 that it is establishing five new institutes focused on different topics, each led by a different university, and each to receive $20 million over five years. One, led by the University of Oklahoma in Norman, will use AI systems to improve climate forecasting accuracy. Another, at the University of Texas at Austin, will focus on the next generation of machine-learning algorithms. A third, led by the University of Colorado Boulder, will apply AI technologies to teaching and learning. The fourth, headed by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, will explore the discovery and synthesis of new materials and drugs using AI systems. And a fifth, led by MIT, will investigate how AI can improve research in fundamental physics. The NSF has put out a call for proposals for eight more AI institutes, which it plans to announce next year. “We have a long history of supporting basic research in artificial intelligence,” says Erwin Gianchandani, the NSF’s deputy assistant director for computer and information science and engineering. In addition, the US Department of Agriculture’s National Institute of Food and Agriculture has committed to funding another two institutes each with $20 million over five years to apply AI to questions of crop yield, pest resistance and food distribution. Access to massive data sets on which to train machine-learning systems is one advantage that both the US and China have, says Araya. Europe, on the other hand, has stringent data laws, which protect people’s privacy, but limit its resources for training AI algorithms. “So, it seems unlikely that Europe will produce very sophisticated AI as a consequence,” he says. “China is at the opposite end of the spectrum, where it has few data protections, and huge access to varied and diverse pieces of data.” The NSF doesn’t make decisions based on global competition, says Rebecca Keiser, the organization’s first chief of research security strategy and policy. Her position is designed to safeguard the security of federally funded research, while promoting international collaborations. “We think of it more in terms of the impact that our funding is going to have, rather than from a nation perspective. The fact that it also contributes to US global science leadership is fabulous,” says Keiser. As for competing against China in AI, she says, “We don’t really know how much, and where, they’re investing, so it’s hard to compete against that.” With funding from other major US agencies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and National Institutes of Health, the US government expected to spend almost $5 billion on unclassified AI research in 2020. Other countries are investing, too. The UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council gave out nearly £160 million (US$212 million) in 2020. The European Commission, which has been supporting research through its Horizon 2020 programme, says public and private investment in AI should reach €20 billion (US$23 billion) across Europe by the end of 2020. Even with other countries placing emphasis on AI research, including Israel, Japan, Singapore and Australia, the race comes down to China versus the US, Araya says. The refinement of AI systems is driven not simply by academic questions, but by applying the systems’ intelligence to practical problems. Countries will probably make advances by using AI in areas where they already have expertise, says Ding, such as automation in Germany or robotics in Japan. Having so many researchers around the globe tackling all aspects of AI should advance the whole field, says Keiser. “It’s always good to have a bit of healthy competition.”

**The U.S. is currently winning the AI race against China.**

JAMES **COOPER AND** KASHYAP **KOMPELLA** 02/03/**22** (OPINION CONTRIBUTORS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/06/10/the-biden-administration-launches-the-national-artificial-intelligence-research-resource-task-force/, “No, China is not winning the AI race”, Retrieved 2/23/22)

The global competition between the United States and China continues apace. **Technology is** rightly **seen as providing unique leverage to win this geopolitical race. The U.S. long has been the global technology powerhouse**, but not surprisingly, we have heard much about the Chinese government’s [ambition to dominate](https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025) high-tech industries such as 5G telecommunications, autonomous vehicles, blockchain, and semiconductor chips.  In this light, as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the [Chinese focus](https://www.afr.com/technology/is-china-winning-the-ai-race-20200805-p55imu) on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. **Some have gone so far as to conclude that**[**the West has already lost the AI race**](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/why-china-will-win-the-global-battle-for-ai-dominance)**.** Don’t believe the hype. To be sure, **the availability of large amounts of data is at the heart of AI success**. It is tempting to think that less-democratic regimes that amass huge amounts of data about their citizens and have scant regard for privacy can develop better AI systems using that data. However, all other things being equal, better and higher quality AI systems emerge from countries with strong data privacy and data protection regulations because AI systems must undergo greater scrutiny during their development and deployment. [An example](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/innovation-spotlight-providing-adverse-action-notices-when-using-ai-ml-models/) of this can be seen in the United States regarding fair lending practices and consumer protection from credit bureaus. Further, the market for AI is global, and such high-quality AI systems find buyers in other countries as well. Around the globe, Big Tech’s rising power has resulted in calls for more oversight. In a drastic move that stunned the industry and analysts alike, **the Chinese government**[**recently rewrote**](https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2021/11/08/xi-jinpings-crackdown-on-chinese-tech-firms-will-continue)**the rulebook for the country’s technology industry.** In effect, China is vacating entire swaths of digital and creative industries, arenas that serve as training grounds and talent factories for other industries. **This more restrictive approach** may not bode well **for China’s AI industry in the long term.** China may find itself constrained on the extent of automation and AI in its manufacturing sector — labor-intensive manufacturing remains China’s main strength, and a high degree of automation can result in job losses, labor unrest, and instability. Meanwhile, there is bipartisan support for AI in the United States. Former [President Trump](https://thehill.com/people/donald-trump) proposed [increasing funding](https://thehill.com/policy/technology/482402-trump-budget-proposal-boosts-funding-for-artificial-intelligence-quantum) for AI development through the National Science Foundation. The [National AI Initiative Act](https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt617/CRPT-116hrpt617.pdf#page=1215) of 2020 signaled a sense of urgency and suggested that several federal agencies create a national strategy on artificial intelligence. **The Biden administration has formed the A**rtificial **I**ntelligence **Research Resource Task Force to develop a roadmap to foment AI research and spark innovation nationwide. There is draft legislation, at both the state and federal level, to promote responsible use of AI and prevent its misuse**. Strong objections to the use of facial recognition and other AI systems by law enforcement in the U.S., raised by civil liberties advocates, have led some local authorities, such as the City of San Francisco, to [ban such systems](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/facial-recognition-software-controversy.html?action=click&module=MoreInSection&pgtype=Article&region=Footer&contentCollection=Technology). To use a Silicon Valley phrase, these debates are “not a bug, but a feature.” They shine a light on the limitations of AI systems and help to set the “rules of the road” for proper use of AI. **This will establish the U.S**. **as a global leader in AI regulation**, once lawmakers and regulators do their work. China, meanwhile, has faced strong [global criticism](https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/05/03/china-new-data-breach-exposes-facial-recognition-and-ethnicity-tracking-in-beijing/#5623644334a7) for using facial recognition software to [monitor and surveil Uyghurs](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html?module=inline.) in its Xinjiang region. China has outlined a set of [AI ethics principles](https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/04/china-s-new-ai-governance-initiatives-shouldn-t-be-ignored-pub-86127), but the jury is still out on enforcement and how they function in practice. The increasing number of AI research papers and [patents](http://ipjournal.law.wfu.edu/files/2021/12/22-Wake-Forest-J.-Bus.-Intell.-Prop.-L.-43.pdf) by Chinese researchers is often cited as proof that China has caught up with the United States in this field. The increased focus is good for the Chinese AI ecosystem, and it will help them solve China-specific problems. But dominance in this emerging strategic industry is not guaranteed. **The U.S. has several strategic advantages, including: the strengths of its higher education and research institutes**, which attract the best STEM talent from across the world; **the**[**largest venture capital ecosystem**](https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/tracking-ai-investment/); **and the largest number of** technology unicorns (**start-ups with private valuations** greater than $1 billion).  Beijing says Taiwan is 'not Ukraine,' has always been part of China Big Tech allies point to China, Russia threat in push to squash...**China is not overtaking the U.S. in artificial intelligence.** The current evidence and trajectory paint a clear picture: The conditions for AI to flourish, such as incentives to experiment, freedom to pursue opportunities without restrictions, and the coming guardrails to prevent misuse, favor U.S. leadership. This is still the United States’s game to lose — though maybe both countries could win through collaboration. To solve planet-scale problems such as climate change, we are going to need AI solutions from both competitors.

#### The OECD solves the case—they have agreed to support the responsible and ethical approach to AI.

John R. Allen, 3/24/2021 (President of the Brookings Institution, “It is time to negotiate global treaties on artificial intelligence,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/03/24/it-is-time-to-negotiate-global-treaties-on-artificial-intelligence/>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The good news is there are some international entities that already are working on these issues. For example, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence is a group of more than a dozen democratic nations that have agreed to “support the responsible and human-centric development and use of AI in a manner consistent with human rights, fundamental freedoms, and our shared democratic values.” This community of democracies is run by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and features high-level convenings, research, and technical assistance.

### Extensions #2: AI Tech Not Key to Military Power

#### Agile bureaucracies, not the best technology, will win the global tech competition race.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/ 2020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/%202020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html))

Today, NATO’s competition is a global one and the race is one of technological adoption – that is, the acceptance, integration and use of new technology in society. From artificial intelligence to quantum and everything in between, governments are in a race to leverage these technologies at scale and speed – first adopter advantage for emerging disruptive tech could not be more prevalent in the world of geopolitics and deterrence. Indeed, the nations that win this race may be those with the most agile bureaucracy rather those with the best technology.

#### AI is not key to military innovations.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from <https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>)

It is important to distinguish these potential technological innovations from military innovations. While military innovations are often linked to changes in technology,41 it is not always the case. Military innovations are significant changes in organizational behavior and ways that a military fights that are designed to increase its ability to effectively translate capabilities into power.42 The use of aircraft carriers as mobile airfields by the United States and Japan is a prototypical example. While AI could potentially enable a number of military innovations, it is not a military innovation itself, and no applications of AI have been used in ways that would count as a military innovation at this point.

#### Technological innovation rarely influences the balance of power.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from <https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>)

Decades of research demonstrates that the impact of technological change on global politics — whether it is change in economics, society at large, diplomacy, or military power — depends much more on how governments and organizations make choices about the adoption and use of new capabilities than on the technologies themselves.48 Scholarship on military innovation by Barry Posen, Stephen P. Rosen, and others shows that technological innovation alone rarely shapes the balance of power.49 Instead, it is how militaries use a technology that makes a difference.50 A military’s ability to employ a technology depends in part on the complexity of the technology, how difficult it is to use, and whether it operates in predictable and explainable ways. These factors influence the trust that senior military leaders have in the technology and whether they use it.51 Additionally, the more bureaucratically disruptive it is to adopt a technology, the more challenging it can be for older, more established organizations to do so — particularly if the organization is underinvested in research and development designed to integrate new technologies and ideas.52

#### Competition for AI technology will be multilateral and not bilateral.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from <https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>)

The commercial drivers of AI technology, and the speed with which new algorithms diffuse, would make competition much broader than it was during the bilateral space race. Competition is much more likely to be multilateral, featuring countries and companies around the world. A better analogy might be to the competition surrounding the development of Second Industrial Revolution technologies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. France, Germany, Britain, Japan, the United States, and others vied for supremacy in steel production, chemicals, petroleum, electricity, and other areas.

#### The AI technology itself is not key to military power—it is how it is used.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from <https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>)

Military and economic history suggests that the effect of narrow AI could be quite large, even if suggestions of AI triggering a new industrial revolution are overstated. Adoption capacity theory shows that changes in relative military power become more likely in cases of military innovations that require large organizational changes and the adoption of new operational concepts. Even if the United States, China, and Russia were to end up with similar levels of basic AI capacity over the next decade, the history of military innovations from the phalanx to blitzkrieg suggests it is how they and others use AI that will matter most for the future of military power.

### Extensions #3: Chinese International Leadership Good

#### Chinese leadership will lead to peaceful coexistence and cooperation.

Global Times, 2021 CHINA WINS INCREASING SUPPORT AT UN DURING 50 YRS, OPPOSING UNILATERALISM, PROTECTIONISM AND HEGEMONY. Oct. 22, 2021. Retrieved May 5, 2022 from <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1237051.shtml>

China's stance on political security, human rights and development has gained acceptance among UN members as they have been made based on UN principles and represented the stance of the majority of developing countries, Zhang said. "The cooperation between China and the UN represents the future direction of the world with peaceful coexistence and cooperation, and the US' hegemonic policy will be isolated," Hua said.

### Extensions #4: Liberal International Order Defense

#### Multiple alt causes for the collapse of the LIO they don’t solve:

Luke Amadi, 2020 (Department of Political & Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, “Globalization and the changing liberal international order: A review of the literature,” <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590051X20300046>, Retrieved 9/19/2021)

Recent trends across Europe and America suggest that the liberal international order is increasingly changing. The changes are evident in the rise of new nationalism following the Brexit referendum of 2016 and subsequent exit of the UK from EU, the Catalonia independence referendum of 2017, the 2018 New Caledonia referendum in France, plus decline in multilateralism and rise in trade protectionism at the heels of the new US- led trade war with China. Other signs of change include the new US immigration policies and the proposed wall on the US/Mexico border, a shift of U.S. policy from openness to isolationism, and the withdrawal of the U.S. from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. This article – traces the causal linkages between globalization and the changing international order. It revisits some of the assumptions and promises of globalization and argues that the changes suggest the decline of the liberal international order on which the world had been situated for decades. Conclusion reflects on the future of global governance.

#### Can’t repair the LIO—three reasons

John J. Mearsheimer, 2019 (professor of international relations @ Chicago, “Bound to Fail,” [https://www.belfercenter.org/ publication/bound-fail-rise-and-fall-liberal-international-order](https://www.belfercenter.org/%20publication/bound-fail-rise-and-fall-liberal-international-order), Retrieved 9/19/2021)

By 2019, it was clear that the liberal international order was in deep trouble. The tectonic plates that underpin it are shifting, and little can be done to repair and rescue it. Indeed, that order was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction. The fall of the liberal international order horrifies the Western elites who built it and who have benefited from it in many ways.1 These elites fervently believe that this order was and remains an important force for promoting peace and prosperity around the globe. Many of them blame President Donald Trump for its demise. After all, he expressed contempt for the liberal order when campaigning for president in 2016; and since taking office, he has pur-sued policies that seem designed to tear it down. It would be a mistake, however, to think that the liberal international order is in trouble solely because of Trump’s rhetoric or policies. In fact, more funda¬mental problems are at play, which account for why Trump has been able to successfully challenge an order that enjoys almost universal support among the foreign policy elites in the West. The aim of this article is to determine why the liberal world order is in big trouble and to identify the kind of inter¬national order that will replace it. I offer three main sets of arguments. First, because states in the modern world are deeply interconnected in a variety of ways, orders are essential for facilitating efficient and timely interactions. There are different kinds of inter-national orders, and which type emerges depends primarily on the global dis-tribution of power. But when the system is unipolar, the political ideology of the sole pole also matters. Liberal international orders can arise only in unipo-lar systems where the leading state is a liberal democracy. Second, the United States has led two different orders since World War II. The Cold War order, which is sometimes mistakenly referred to as a “liberal international order,” was neither liberal nor international. It was a bounded or-der that was limited mainly to the West and was realist in all its key dimen-sions. It had certain features that were also consistent with a liberal order, but those attributes were based on realist logic. The U.S.-led post–Cold War order, on the other hand, is liberal and international, and thus differs in fundamental ways from the bounded order the United States dominated during the Cold War. Third, the post–Cold War liberal international order was doomed to col-lapse, because the key policies on which it rested are deeply flawed. Spreading liberal democracy around the globe, which is of paramount importance for building such an order, not only is extremely difficult, but often poisons rela¬tions with other countries and sometimes leads to disastrous wars. National¬ism within the target state is the main obstacle to the promotion of democracy, but balance of power politics also function as an important blocking force. Furthermore, the liberal order’s tendency to privilege international in-stitutions over domestic considerations, as well as its deep commitment to po-rous, if not open borders, has had toxic political effects inside the leading liberal states themselves, including the U.S. unipole. Those policies clash with nationalism over key issues such as sovereignty and national identity. Be¬cause nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on the planet, it in¬variably trumps liberalism whenever the two clash, thus undermining the order at its core. In addition, hyperglobalization, which sought to minimize barriers to global trade and investment, resulted in lost jobs, declining wages, and rising income inequality throughout the liberal world. It also made the international finan¬cial system less stable, leading to recurring financial crises. Those troubles then morphed into political problems, further eroding support for the liberal order.

### East China Sea Defense

#### No Senkakus conflict—four reasons:

M. Taylor Fravel, 8/19/2019 (Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program at MIT), “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” <https://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/Triangle/7_fravel.pdf>

The dynamics of the Senkaku Islands dispute since the 1970s present a puzzle. At first glance, one might expect that this dispute should be fraught with tension and even violence. Territorial disputes often serve as proxies for broader conflicts of interests, especially between states that might be characterized as enduring or strategic rivals, such as China and Japan.21 Although the China-Japan economic relationship has continued to deepen since the end of the Cold War, political relations have oscillated between pe¬riods of heightened friction and relative calm.22 At the same time, both sides see the islands as important real estate, endowed with strategic significance and economic value, characteristics that increase a state’s willingness to use force in a territorial dispute.23 China has also used force in other disputes over offshore islands, most notably over the Paracels in 1974 and the Spratlys in 1988 and 1994.24 Finally, given the history of Japan’s occupation of parts of China, one might expect territorial issues to be especially prominent as a source of friction between the two countries and one that leaders might manipulate to mobilize society, perhaps for diversionary ends.25 Since 1949, however, China has never used force against Japan over the Senkaku Islands, although it did display its potential to use force once, in 1978, during the peace treaty negotiations.26 The fact that armed conflict over the islands has been avoided is a major accomplishment and one that deserves detailed examination because, in many ways, it is unexpected. The analysis below focuses mostly on China for several reasons. First—unlike Japan—China, as noted above, has used force in its other territorial disputes since the end of World War II and in half of its offshore island disputes. Second, as the “challenger” in the Senkakus dispute, force remains a vi¬able option for China to regain sovereignty of the islands to improve its otherwise weak position or to compel concessions from Japan. By contrast, because Japan already occupies and controls the islands, force is not necessary to improve its claim and would only be used to deter or prevent a Chinese attack. Nevertheless, even as the “defender,” the use of force for Japan remains a viable option under certain conditions. In par¬ticular, because Japan already controls the islands, it may be more willing to use force to arrest or reverse decline in its position in the dispute in the face of increasing Chinese provocations, such as the dispatch of mainland survey ships within the territorial waters of the islands in December 2008. Indeed, reflecting concerns about China’s growing military power and naval activities in the East China Sea, Japan’s military drafted a contingency plan in November 2004 “to defend the southern remote islands off Kyushu and Okinawa from possible invasion.”27 Explaining state inaction or the absence of a particular outcome such as the use of force presents a challenge for social scientists. One of the core problems is that patterns of inaction or nonevents are likely to be overdetermined; that is, they are consistent with multiple if not overlap-ping variables and explanations. As a particular behavior is not observed, it is more challenging to identify those factors that vary with inaction as opposed to using force or offering to compromise. Nevertheless, four reasons help explain the absence of violent conflict in the Senkaku dis¬pute since 1972: deterrence, de facto control, regional rivalry, and active dispute management. Deterrence The first and most important reason is deterrence. Put simply, China has lacked the military means to execute a limited-aims operation to seize and defend the islands from any counterattack. Although China did clash with South Vietnam in 1974 and Vietnam in 1988 in other offshore island conflicts, those countries possessed very limited naval power and China was able to achieve victory after short clashes. By contrast, Japan possesses the strongest and most professional navy of any East Asian country.28 More importantly, however, the US alliance with Japan has arguably deterred China from taking any armed action over the islands. Given Article V, use of force over the Senkakus would run the very real risk of conflict with the United States—conflict that China would prefer to avoid. As discussed below in the section on dispute management, public US statements regard¬ing its commitment under the treaty that were issued during moments of tension in the dispute represent subtle deterrent actions. De Facto Control The continuous occupation of the disputed islands by Japan during the period when their sovereignty has been contested is a second reason for the absence of escalation. Continuous occupation by one state in a territo¬rial dispute significantly increases the cost for the other side (in this case China) of using force, as the international community would view any use of force as a clear sign of revisionist behavior. Occupation by one side, in other words, reinforces the status quo bias of the international system. By contrast, although China did use force in the Paracels and the Spratlys, it seized islands and coral reefs that were claimed but not occupied by other states and vacant real estate (with the exception of Pattle Island in the Paracels). In disputes on its land border, China has not seized large amounts of disputed territory through the use of force, especially when contested territory has been occupied by other states. In its 1962 war with India over disputed areas along its southwestern frontier, for example, China won a military victory but then withdrew to the line of actual control that had existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities.29 Regional Rivalry A third reason for the absence of escalation stems from the continuing competition between China and Japan for diplomatic influence within East Asia. For different reasons, both countries likely want to maintain reputations as constructive and benign powers in the region. Escalation or use of force over the Senkakus would tarnish that reputation. In particular, China’s current diplomatic strategy revolves around the notions of “peaceful development” and “reassurance.”30 Belligerence over territory would send a signal to most states in the region that a more powerful China might also be more aggressive, thus increasing suspicion and uncertainty about China’s long-term intentions. Active Dispute Management A fourth and underexamined reason is how both sides have sought to manage the dispute to avoid unwanted spirals of hostility and tension that might culminate in the use of force. Several aspects of dispute management must be stressed, as they have received little attention in analyses of the Senkaku dispute or, for that matter, in the international relations scholar¬ship on territorial disputes. Even if China has been deterred by US power, Japanese control of the disputed islands, or potential reputational costs, the management of tensions in this dispute is also important. All three countries have played a role in the successful management of the dispute, where success is defined as the absence of conflict. Limited Access Perhaps the leading source of friction in the dispute over the past two decades has been efforts by citizen activists to land on the islands to demonstrate their countries’ sovereignty claims. These ac-tions then compel governments to get involved in the dispute, increasing the potential for armed conflict. In the 1990s, several crises over the is¬lands occurred when activist groups from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan journeyed to the disputed rocks. Japanese activists, most notably from the Japan Youth League, frequently visited the islands in the 1990s to main¬tain a lighthouse on Uotsuri (Diaoyu) Island that was first built in 1978.31 In response, individuals from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China sought to land on the Senkakus to support China’s claims. In 1996, a Hong Kong citizen, David Chan, drowned as he attempted to land and plant a flag on one of the islands.32 A number of other unsuccessful attempts have also been made by groups supporting China’s claim, but in 2004, activists from Mainland China successfully landed on the islands. As a private citizen owns three of the five main islands, the Japanese government was unable (or perhaps just unwilling) to prevent its own citi¬zens from making symbolic visits and increasing the potential for conflict in the dispute. Since 2002, however, the Japanese government has taken a number of steps to enhance its control over the islands and limit access by Japanese citizens, thereby reducing incentives for Chinese patriotic groups to land on the islands in response. First, in April 2002, the Japanese government entered into a lease for the three islands remaining outside of government control. This placed all of the disputed features under the direct control of the Japanese government, and because the government became a leaseholder, it could both prevent the sale of the islands to activists who might seek to make use of them for political goals and block activists from all sides from landing on the islands.33 Second, just one month after the first successful landing on the islands by Mainland Chinese activists in March 2004, the Japanese government decided to station two Coast Guard vessels near the islands in order to prevent individuals from landing on them in the future.34 Third, in February 2005, Japan further consolidated control over the islands when it announced that it had assumed control of the lighthouse on Uotsuri that had been built and maintained by the Japan Youth League. These actions elicited sharp protests in Beijing and Taipei as they were viewed as unilateral assertions of sovereignty over contested territory and consolidation of Japanese control. Nevertheless, they lowered tensions by removing perhaps the greatest irritant in the dispute, the actions of activ¬ist citizens. In the past, the rationale for these visits by Japanese activists was the need to maintain the lighthouses and replace their solar-powered batteries. Indeed, according to public news sources, no Japanese activists have successfully landed on the islands since 2003.35 Although this has not prevented subsequent attempts by Chinese and Taiwanese patriotic groups to land on the islands, the Japanese government has been able to intercept these ships rapidly through the deployment of Coast Guard ves¬sels in surrounding waters. Similarly, the Chinese government has sought to restrict the activities of its own citizens around the islands. For most of the 1990s, only activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan, not Mainland China, sought to land on the islands in protest. In 2003, however, a mainland-based group, the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands, began preparations for a voyage to the islands.36 After several reconnaissance trips, the federation landed seven members on Uotsuri in March 2004.37 These individuals were detained by the Japanese Coast Guard and deported to China 48 hours later. Although it is not clear what the Chinese government’s policy toward such groups was before this landing, since then it has sought to prevent any further landings or maritime excursions to the islands by its citizens from Chinese ports. In July 2004, local officials in Fujian prevented members of the federation from using Chinese fishing vessels for noncommercial purposes such as traveling to the islands.38 And, following anti-Japan protests in April 2005, the government raided the federation’s offices in Beijing in July 2005.39 In October 2007, four members of the federation who had entered Japanese territorial waters in an attempt to land on the islands were placed under house arrest when they returned to China.40 Avoidance of Social Mobilization A second aspect of dispute manage-ment that deserves mention is that China has avoided mobilizing the public around the dispute. Indeed, despite its potential to rally people around the flag and its role in past patriotic education campaigns, the Senkakus dispute rarely appears in official newspapers. As figure 1 demonstrates, the total number of articles that refer to “Diaoyu Dao” (Senkaku Islands) in the title that have appeared in the People’s Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun bao) and the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) since 1987 is low. In some years, no articles appeared at all. Moreover, as shown in figure 2, the frequency of articles on the Senkakus is roughly one-tenth of those published on the Spratlys and an even smaller fraction of those concerning Taiwan. No clear trend exists in the frequency or timing of articles on the Senkakus either. Analysis of individual news reports suggests that the publication of articles is caused by events linked to the dispute, especially activists’ attempts to land on the islands as well as Japan’s own administrative actions.

#### Japan won’t escalate—they’ll just give up the Senkakus:

Grant Newsham, 8/12/2020 (retired US Marine Corps officer and former US diplomat, currently is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies and the Center for Security Policy, “Why Japan may cede the Senkakus to China,” <https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/why-japan-may-cede-the-senkakus-to-china/>, Retrieved 9/17/2020)

The People’s Republic of China is turning up the heat around Japan’s Senkaku Islands, which the Chinese also claim and call the Diaoyu Islands. It is challenging Japanese control and has warned Tokyo not to complain the next time a host of Chinese fishing boats swarm the area with Chinese Coast Guard and PLA Navy ships providing cover. And this is likely to happen sooner rather than later. Japan’s defense minister, Taro Kono, said at an early August news conference that the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) “will act firmly when necessary while joining hands with the Japan Coast Guard.” Kono declined to provide details, saying: “We do not want to show our cards.” Many Western observers have long assumed that if backed into a corner Japan would fight – despite its reticence about things military. The prospect of losing territory to the Chinese is presumably such a corner. Map: Wikimedia And despite their shortcomings, the Self Defense Forces – particularly the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) with its highly professional surface, submarine and anti-submarine forces – have the capability to bloody an opponent’s nose. But maybe the assumption is wrong. It could be that in Japan – or, better said, in those parts of its ruling political and business classes that make such decisions – there is no intention of “going kinetic” to defend the Senkakus. If the Chinese presence becomes overwhelming, Tokyo may simply cede the area to the PRC. It would complain of course, but would it shoot? Or would it reckon that the cost of military confrontation with China would far exceed the value of “some rocks”? Far-fetched? Maybe not. A recently retired JSDF officer, unprompted, recently confided his belief that, even if the Senkaku Islands are invaded by China, the “Japanese government will not choose war.” He expained: “I’m very sorry but Japanese states~~men~~[people] think these affairs” – in this case he was referring both to the Senkakus and the South Korean-controlled Takeshima Islands – “are not military matters but political matters.” I take his point. The Japanese would sort of resist but my own guess is that, if the only way to remove the Chinese were to shoot, Japan wouldn’t do it. This assumes the Chinese don’t start shooting first. If China just comes in and parks itself and even lands some people on the Senkakus and says, “wuddyugonnadoaboutit?,” the government of Japan just might do nothing much. Activists shout slogans and wave the Chinese flag aboard a vessel in Hong Kong, October 22, 2006. Japan and China have sparred over a group of uninhabited islands known as the Senkaku Islands to Japanese and the Diaoyu Islands in China. The area is believed to lie near oil and gas reserves. In October 2006, a boat carrying activists from the Hong Kong-based Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands sailed within 20 km of the main island in the chain before they were warned off by a Japanese patrol boat. Chinese writing on a banner reads: "Japan get out of the Diaoyu Islands". Photo: Reuters/Paul Yeung Activists shout slogans and wave the Chinese flag aboard a vessel bound from Hong Kong to a group of uninhabited islands known to Japanese as the Senkaku Islands and to Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands. Photo: Agencies Recall that the Barack Obama administration allowed the PRC to take de facto control of the South China Sea without putting up a fight – or much of an argument. And back then the US military still had the advantage over the People’s Liberation Army. There are of course Japanese – including factions in the ruling LDP and most members of the JSDF – who think Japan should defend all of the territories it claims. But there were also Americans who thought Obama should forcefully defend US partners and interests in East Asia in the 2010s. If letting go is what Japan’s leaders are thinking of doing, they can’t exactly publicly declare it. For one thing, Japan’s public might be outraged – if public opinion polls, overwhelmingly negative toward China, are anything to go by. But the citizenry doesn’t always matter much in Japan and the government can always simply say, after the fact, “Shoganai” – it couldn’t be helped. One suspects that Japan Inc might be in the “Senkakus aren’t worth a war” camp. The Abe administration recently allotted US$2 billion to help Japanese companies move operations out of China. However, a Japanese friend whom I trust told me the other day that Keidanren – Japan’s powerful business federation – is soon to issue a call for deeper economic ties with China, while citing the PRC’s post-Corona V-shaped recovery. Toyota, Japan’s leading company, is planning to go all-in on electric vehicle production in China. There is a precedent for Japanese business interests shaping defense policy. In 2012 anti-Japanese riots broke out in China – over the Senkakus – and targeted a Japanese supermarket chain’s stores in the PRC. Around the same time, a prominent official close to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda convinced the leader to cancel an upcoming amphibious exercise near Okinawa that I was directly involved with after the Chinese complained. The official’s family owned the stores being targeted in China. No doubt this isn’t unique to Japan. Wall Street and the American business community have pressured successive US administrations to accommodate the PRC for decades. Japanese Special Defense Force personnel marched in a parade in Asaka, Japan, in a file photo. Image: AFP Forum via EPA In fairness, Japan is not ignoring defense. But it almost seems to be going through the motions – hoping China is somehow frightened off or loses interest. Defense spending doesn’t increase much. Recruitment is lackluster. The services can’t easily operate together. Japan’s home-built stealth fighter is scheduled for operations in 2035. And the government still can’t figure out missile defense – or offense. Closer to the Senkakus, the GSDF is fortifying several of Japan’s southern islands and is in the process of installing anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft systems. The MSDF and Japan Coast Guard diligently patrol near the Senkakus, and the Japan Air Self Defense Force intercepts intruding PLA jets intruding into Japanese airspace. However, these activities are disjointed and reactive rather than part of a coherent defense scheme. And Japanese forces are increasingly outmatched numbers-wise by Chinese ships and aircraft. Nor is Senkaku defense a fully joint US-Japan effort, even though the need has been obvious for years. If Japan does give up the Senkakus it may avoid an immediate problem, from Tokyo’s perspective – but that won’t be the end of Chinese demands. Chinese PLA Navy soldiers on a naval vessel in a file photo. Photo: Twitter And where would this leave the Americans? US forces have operated on the assumption that each side will do its part to defend Japan’s territorial integrity. Cede the Senkakus and it raises doubts about Japanese reliability and commitment, as well as complicating US and Japanese military operations in the East China Sea and beyond. And the Americans might reasonably ask: Are there other parts of Japan you intend to give away? Or other instances where you will stand down? If the new American ambassador ever does arrive in Tokyo, his first order of business should be to ask the Japanese what they have in mind for the Senkakus. After 60 years of alliance, one would think both sides would know by now.

### Heg Defense

#### Hegemony doesn’t cause peace—defense spending statistics prove.

Christopher J. Fettweis, 2017 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University), SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 26 2017.

How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 per-cent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irre¬sponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense bud¬get has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 The world grew dra¬matically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clinton, in other words, and kept declining (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance com¬mitments, and forward military presence. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace.

#### Hegemony doesn’t cause peace—areas of the world where the US has little influence are still peaceful.

Christopher J. Fettweis, 2017 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University), SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 26 2017.

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hege¬monic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a com¬mon enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explana-tions, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the non¬aligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counter¬terrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions.

#### Peace is unrelated to hegemony.

Christopher J. Fettweis, 2017 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University), SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 26 2017.

Despite a few persistent, high-profile conflicts in the Middle East, the world is experiencing an era of unprecedented peace and stability. Many scholars have offered explanations for this “New Peace,” to borrow Steven Pinker’s phrase, but few have devoted much time to the possibility that US hegemony has brought stability to the system. This paper examines the theoretical, empirical, and psychological foundations of the hegemonic¬stability explanation for the decline in armed conflict. Those foundations are rather thin, as it turns out, and a review of relevant insights from political psychology suggests that unipolarity and stability are probably epiphenomenal. The New Peace can in all likelihood continue without US dominance and should persist long after unipolarity comes to an end.

#### Hegemonic stability doesn’t lead to peace.

Christopher J. Fettweis, 2017 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University), SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 26 2017.

The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconser¬vative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

### South China Sea Defense

#### Covid and weakening Chinese economy causing them to back down in the South China Seas.

Sean Quirk, 4/7/2020 (JD/MPP joint-degree student at Harvard Law School and Harvard Kennedy School. He holds a BA in Political Science from Columbia University and served as a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy for five years, “Water Wars: Coronavirus Spreads Risk of Conflict Around the South China Sea,” <https://www.lawfareblog.com> /water-wars-coronavirus-spreads-risk-conflict-around-south-china-sea, Retrieved 1/16/2021, rwg)

Around the South China Sea, rival Southeast Asian claimants Malaysia and the Philippines are preoccupied with enforcing mandatory quarantine measures. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte previously self-quarantined as a precaution, and the Philippine armed forces chief of staff recently recovered from COVID-19, the respiratory disease caused by the novel coronavirus. Vietnam and Indonesia are also enforcing measures to limit the spread of the virus. Yet Chinese naval movements in the South China Sea appear lackluster for the time being. Some reporting speculates that a decelerating Chinese economy and a military hampered by COVID-19 could force China to scale back its maritime ambitions in the South China Sea.

#### No war in South China Seas—both sides acting in a restrained and responsible manner:

Hu Bo, 6/12/2020 (Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Research and Research Professor at the Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University, “China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction,” <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/china-us-military-confrontation-in-the-south-china-sea-fact-and-fiction/>, Retrieved 1/16/2021, rwg)

China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction The China-U.S. rivalry in the South China Sea is certainly growing, but war is still some way off. By Hu Bo June 12, 2020 China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction The amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) transits the Pacific Ocean Feb. 15, 2020. Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas V. Huynh No one doubts that the military competition and frictions are real and serious between China and the United States in the South China Sea, when they have rivalrous intentions, tit-for-tat strategies, and daily operational confrontations. China is accused of coercing U.S. allies and partners, militarizing disputed features, and seeking regional hegemony, and the United States is considered to be playing the South China Sea card and containing China’s rise as a maritime power. In the context of overall intensified strategic competition between the two countries, the South China Sea is even less likely to be an exception. But the question remains: how fierce will the competition be? When every day is filled with news of maritime standoffs between China and the United States, many may wonder, will China and the U.S. slip into military conflict? Both sides have reasons to maintain and expand their military presence in the South China Sea. China is the largest littoral state of the South China Sea, and has important interests at stake: territorial sovereignty, jurisdictional waters, and sea lanes of communication. With China’s military modernization, it is natural that more and more military platforms are active in the area. Meanwhile the United States thinks highly of maritime predominance, freedom of navigation, and security commitments to regional states. Thus, since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained the most powerful military presence and executed a variety of complex military operations in the South China Sea. For a long time after World War II, due to China’s weak naval and air forces, there were not many chances for Chinese and American military forces to encounter each other at sea. However, much has changed in the past decade. On the one hand, China’s capacity has rapidly increased, and the progress of the navy and air force is particularly impressive. On the other hand, the United States has grown increasingly worried about China’s rising power and significantly strengthened its naval and air presence since 2009. U.S. aircraft sorties increased by 100 percent to about 1,500, and surface ship presence increased by 60 percent to around 1,000 ship days per year. In this context, frequent military- to-military encounters are inevitable. Neither side is comfortable with the changing situation. The U.S. military is used to being unparalleled and unchallengeable in the South China Sea and is not ready to accommodate China’s maritime rise. Although the People’s Liberation Army is already very strong materially, it is still a novice spiritually and in the process of learning how to interact with its American counterparts as a mature power. But neither side seems to have much to offer other than peaceful coexistence. If both sides develop normally, in terms of power, the future of the South China Sea would be a bipolar region, regardless what kind of intentions they have. Moreover, most countries in the region are reluctant to take sides in the China-U.S. power competition. Therefore, it is hard for either side to re-establish a dominant order here. As the power distribution becomes more balanced, the idea of a managed military conflict is fanciful. One side’s provocation will inevitably invite the other’s retaliation, where spiral escalation is highly possible. Considering that both sides have so many weapon platforms and both are major nuclear powers, the feasibility of a military solution has greatly diminished. The China-U.S. rivalry in the South China Sea is certainly growing, but war is still some way off. There are several maritime encounters between the two sides every day, and thousands every year. Most of them are professional and safe; only a few have involved some risks. The recent pandemic has made both countries and militaries more sensitive, which, to some extent, has heightened the tension of the situation. Because of COVID-19, China and the United States are more concerned and anxious about each other. In addition to maintaining daily operations in the western Pacific, both sides have some new worries. The United States is concerned that China would take advantage of the temporary power vacuum; thus it has deliberately shown more force and given China more diplomatic pressure. China feels that Washington’s South China Sea policy is increasingly desperate to the point that, even during the pandemic, the United States has not forgotten to provoke China. Beijing is also convinced that the U.S., motivated by power competition, is focusing on China’s activities and ignoring the actions of other claimants. From mid-April to early May, the U.S. Navy dispatched several warships, including USS America LHA-6, to the so-called standoff area between the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and the West Capella to deter China’s operations. The PLA Navy was believed to have a similar number of warships there at the same time, which aroused heated discussion among the media and experts. Another less publicized but more intense case was the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance of China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning formation when it was conducting open sea cross-region mobile training while followed by American warships and multiple military aircraft. An anonymous PLA Navy officer revealed that the confrontation was so intense that one U.S. warship even once came within 100 meters of the Chinese carrier. Even so, both sides have remained largely professional and restrained. In fact, neither the Chinese military nor the American military has increased its activity significantly compared with the same period of 2019, despite the impression given by most media reports and expert commentaries. The problem is that these operations are over-exposed and over-focused. In the backdrop of power competition, especially amid the pandemic, in order to show their strength and determination, U.S. forces have given undue prominence to covering and publicizing military activities, giving the media and the public a lot to discuss and imagine. There are some hawks in both countries who take advantage of this and exaggerate the situation. Although most countries including the South China Sea claimants, do not want to see China-U.S. military conflict, some individual countries are indeed rejoicing over the growing competition between China and the United States, which may lead to some opportunity for them to expand. China-U.S. military confrontation or even war in the South China Sea has a huge market. China and the United States are, of course, preparing for any kind of military conflict and the worst scenarios in the South China Sea; however, there is no indication that the two sides want to resolve their contradictions by using force strategically or operationally — despite the repeated war rhetoric from some senior American officials. In daily military interactions, there are really increasing risks, but in the absence of a subjective desire for conflict, these risks are highly likely to be controlled.

### Taiwan Defense

#### No China-Taiwan war—multiple reasons—

Harlan Ullman, 2/18/2022 (Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-10-china-will-not-invade-taiwan/>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Despite Beijing’s longstanding desire to invade and conquer Taiwan and achieve “one China,” China simply lacks the military capability and capacity to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan for the foreseeable future. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, to undertake an invasion, China would need over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million) that would have to be transported in many thousands of ships. Although Beijing is unlikely to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, given China’s strength, autocratic government, and ambitions, the United States cannot totally ignore the risk of such an attack. At the same time, however, Washington should develop an overall strategy designed to deter the most likely scenarios—such as imposing economic and financial embargoes on Taiwan, imposing a maritime blockade of the island, or attempting a regime change from within—or prevail militarily if deterrence fails. China does have many other options for pressuring Taiwan. What’s the issue? The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) was substantially predicated on preventing two faits accomplis: a Russian invasion of the Baltics and a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. To what degree these scenarios will survive the Biden administration’s soon-to- be-released strategic review remains to be seen. The most likely outcome is that “integrated deterrence,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term—for now more a slogan than a strategic concept that attempts a more “wholistic” all-of-government effort—will become prominent, as will a greater focus on the “deter” element rather than on “defeat” as was the last NDS. Defining what defeat means and how it would be achieved remains elusive. Some observers believe that how the United States handles the Ukraine crisis will be closely watched by China. That is true. But, as this paper argues, the Ukraine crisis will not influence Chinese decisions on whether or not to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion because, given the force demands, China simply lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. The current and former heads of Indo-Pacific Command have warned about China’s building the necessary forces to invade and conquer Taiwan, possibly by decade’s end. Given China’s long-standing determination to make Taiwan part of the mainland and achieve “one China,” a military takeover of Taiwan sounds plausible. However, this notion is based on a fundamental misperception regarding China’s capability to launch a major amphibious assault. If China were to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, what would that take in terms of forces and force levels? Does China possess the requisite numbers and capabilities? If not, when, if at all, might it build those forces that, if history counts, would number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of ships and maritime assault vehicles? Current and past studies do not successfully or specifically address these questions. These studies focus on the how, but not on the specific manpower requirements of what would be required to carry out an invasion. The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change. Further, Taiwan is not conducive to any form of amphibious assault. A handful of landing sites on the west coast are blocked by proximate mountainous areas running the length of the 250-mile-long island, some approaching 10,000 feet in height. Defenders could fall back using this difficult terrain to wage a guerrilla war. Moreover, Taiwan lacks the infrastructure to support over a million invaders and their logistical needs, most of which would have to come from the mainland. Fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels. Nevertheless, given China’s size, strength, autocratic government, ambitions, and commitment to “one China,” the United States cannot totally rule out the possibility of an amphibious assault. Focusing US resources primarily on such a scenario would be a grave mistake, however. If the danger of Chinese aggression against, and indeed an invasion of, Taiwan is considered among the likely or plausible scenarios, the response must be to plan to defeat that outcome. Any military conflict with the United States beyond a Taiwan scenario would be a home game for China and an away game for the United States and those who might be persuaded to join the fight. Substantial resources would be needed to compensate for the disadvantages of geography and external lines of communications. Taiwan is only 100 miles off the Chinese coast. With China’s DF-21 and other missiles with ranges of 1,500-2,000 miles, a reinforcing naval force would come under fire for at least two or more day’s steaming before reaching the combat area. They would also have to avoid submarine and other maritime threats. The same problem applies to aviation units that would enter China’s air defense zones. To complicate this matter of reinforcement and coming to Taiwan’s defense, some polls show that Americans are more worried about a Chinese invasion than are the Taiwanese. Defending a friend is more difficult when that friend is less preoccupied or concerned with the threat than US citizens are. The United States cannot be successful in defending Taiwan if it regards the Chinese threat as more dangerous than the country it intends to protect. Finally, fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels. An expeditionary force designed to protect Taiwan may not fit more relevant roles such as supporting formal treaty allies, responding to other contingencies, and influencing China by force dispositions—especially if there is no appetite to invade in the first place. It was no accident that Napoleon and Hitler failed to cross the 25-mile wide English Channel! The United States must consider and plan for many contingencies with respect to Taiwan. China has options other than a full-scale amphibious invasion. It could seize small islands belonging to Taiwan, such as Kinmen and Matsu, to exert leverage. It could impose economic and financial embargoes. It could impose a physical blockade with its maritime militia physically denying access to the island. It could attempt a regime change from within, using the equivalent of Russia’s “Little Green Men” who seized the Crimean Parliament in 2014. China could infiltrate the political parties and Taiwanese government and use influence operations to change public support. It could contrive or provoke a crisis to force Taiwan to accept a settlement that could lead to annexation. It could obliterate Taiwan under a rain of missiles. However, unless Taiwan were to declare independence, it is very unlikely that—barring a crisis—China would attempt any direct annexation. Moreover, an amphibious assault is not now a serious or feasible option. Why does it matter? Misunderstanding an adversary in developing a strategy leads to failure, or worse. Hitler thought Russia would fold in 1941. The Japanese thought Pearl Harbor would force an American capitulation. Gen. Douglas MacArthur did not believe the Chinese would intervene in Korea as his forces raced toward the Yalu River in late 1950. Washington believed it could bomb North Vietnam into submission, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraqis could easily takeover governing their country after Saddam Hussein had been overthrown. The Pentagon’s civilian leaders have declared China to be “the pacing challenge for the US military.” Many Americans are fearful that a rising China’s increasing diplomatic assertiveness, military buildup, militarizing small islets in the China Seas, and pursuit of the ambitious Belt-and-Road Initiative is a danger not only to the United States, but to much of the world. However, the nature of the specific threats is not clear. A possible Taiwan invasion must be plausible and based on why and how China could or would embark on that course of action. Thus far, no US administration has explained how such an invasion would be carried out. This focus on a single contingency distorts defense planning, especially given the Russian buildup around Ukraine. The US Army and Marine Corps are pivoting to the Pacific. However, neither service has justified this shift beyond pointing to the rise of China; nor have they explained how China would be contained, deterred and, if war comes, defeated. Without a rationale for a substantial increase of land forces in the region, it is impossible to judge the value of this redeployment. With the Marines eliminating tanks and much of their heavy artillery, the traditional role of amphibious operations will have to be redefined. The Navy has long considered the Pacific its familial home. Under the Obama administration, the Navy had planned to shift 60 percent of the fleet to Asia by 2020. Unfortunately, because the size of the Navy did not meet its growth objectives, the actual number of ships in the Pacific will be less than before the pivot. Just as the Army and Marines have not specified the rationale for this shift except in general terms, neither has the Navy. What is the solution? 1 Understand China’s true intentions and capabilities. The first and most obvious solution is the most difficult to achieve: rely on objective, unbiased, fact-based analysis of the likelihood of a Chinese amphibious invasion and the measures required to deter or defeat it. In today’s fractured, contentious, and hyper-partisan political environment, fact, truth, and objectivity have become casualties. For example, the current debate should cover more details over what size force China might require in these contingencies, although Operation Causeway would seem to be the definitive guide. 2 Learn how to win wars, not just battles. No matter how much effort is placed on developing policy and strategy, successive US administrations have ignored the following contradiction: The US military has become adept at winning battles, but the United States has become adept at losing wars. This must change. US policymakers and strategists should take account of the failures of the last several decades and incorporate these lessons into discussions of what a war with China would entail and how it might end. 3 US strategy to address the threat to Taiwan must change. The US military is based on an offensive, firepower-intensive strategy that requires highly expensive, often vulnerable, complicated systems for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as large platforms that can only be produced by major defense contractors. Many are “legacy systems,” meaning that their use was important in the past but is less so today. Today’s military may not need some of these systems, contributing to a misallocation of resources and taxing an overly strained defense budget. However, a Taiwanese invasion scenario—implausible though it may be—plays to sustaining the current force design and the weapons that are being procured. Rather than persisting with an offensive-minded approach based on costly and vulnerable platforms, US and Taiwanese planners must adopt a Porcupine Defense and its Pacific variant, a Mobile Maritime Defense, to keep China’s military within the first island chain that runs from Japan in the Pacific northeast through Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The concept has been detailed elsewhere, including in References A and B. The purpose of the Porcupine and associated defenses, like the metaphorical quilled creature, is to counter the enemy’s strategy and disrupt any attack by deploying daunting defensive measures that would cause great pain to an assailant and thus complicate and deter a possible attack. In the case of Taiwan, the Porcupine Defense entails a combination of massive numbers of drones and unmanned vehicles along with anti-air and armor missiles, such as Stingers and Javelins, as well as sea mines, to disrupt any attack. Major anti-command-and-control cyber and influence operations are essential, along with heavy use of deception and misdirection to disrupt and confuse any enemy attack. Such a strategy would greatly complicate any future bid by China to take the island by force. But can Taiwan be convinced to undertake this approach? Taiwan has chosen to buy systems to attack China. This is a mistake. Taiwan will never have the capacity to deter a Chinese assault by threat of retaliation. However, at lower cost, this Porcupine capability can be bought. Takeaway The overriding issue for the United States is whether it is able to develop an overall strategy that will deter the most likely scenarios, or prevail militarily if deterrence fails. Such a strategy must be affordable. If not, the United States will be pursuing the wrong response to a highly unlikely Chinese contingency, rather than a strategy based on current and future reality. That is not a prescription for success.

#### No Taiwan war, even if Beijing thinks it has a military advantage

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In Taiwan, political leaders worry that Xi wants to cement his legacy with a breakthrough on Taiwan. Once shy about revealing its strengths, Beijing under Xi has adopted a different approach, flaunting its wealth and power and strengthening the People’s Liberation Army to deter any challengers. Regionally, the conventional balance of military power is tipping towards China. The People’s Liberation Army has long equipped itself and planned for a cross-straits conflict. However, a full-frontal Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains unlikely in the near term. There are numerous factors that would deter such an invasion, including Taiwan’s unwelcoming geography and climate, the difficulties of staging an amphibious landing, the unknown appetite in the United States for intervention and Japan’s interests in the Taiwan Strait. Other military options which would be less risky, and potentially less disruptive to trade, include a targeted naval blockade.[36] Even if Beijing were to take over Taiwan militarily, Hong Kong has illustrated how difficult it would be to occupy the island in the face of near certain local resistance. The resulting political and security crisis for China and the broader region would be unprecedented since World War II. Taiwanese resistance, both on the island and by a mobilised Taiwanese diaspora, would be a test for national politics around the world, including in Australia. The People’s Liberation Army is untested, both in battle and in the business of occupation, and China’s institutions and military resources would be stretched by such a war.[37] It is unsurprising then that Beijing is pursuing its current strategy of multi-front hybrid warfare against the island to force an opening of talks, rather than military action.

## Conflict Resolution Answers

### 1NC — Conflict Resolution Advantage

#### 1. TURN: AI tech increases the risk of accidents and false alarms—leading to nuclear conflict.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

AI technology fused with advanced weapons (potentially simultaneously across multiple combat zones) could allow these systems to react at machine speed and boost the overall pace of combat. Despite the tactical advantages of being able to react in real time, especially in asymmetric contested environments, experts warn that massive increases in the speed of combat could result in machines react¬ing to combat situations at a pace that surpasses human comprehension—so much so that commanders might be unable to control, contain, or terminate events.5 Because human commanders would be unable to react quickly enough, the decision to delegate control to an autonomous system would be a challenging ethical and tactical dilemma. Thus, while AI-enabled autonomous early-warning systems would theoretically allow defense planners to identify and monitor threats faster and more reliably than before, the lack of human judgment and supervision coupled with the inherent brittleness (or lack of real-world common sense to deal with new situations) and black box (or opaque and unex¬plainable) characteristics of AI machine-learning algorithms mean that the risk of destabilizing acci¬dents and false alarms will likely rise. As strategist Thomas Schelling argued, “when speed is critical, the victim [in this case a nuclear-armed state] of an accident or a false alarm is under terrible pressure.”6 This point is especially true of the time pressures associated with AI. Fear created by the unpredictability and uncertainty of an enemy conducting warfare at machine speed may, therefore, tempt nuclear states to automate their nuclear retaliatory capability. That is, all else being equal, a nuclear-armed state less confident in its second-strike capabilities (i.e., China, North Korea, Pakistan, and perhaps Russia) will be more inclined to use automation. The high speed associated with AI and autonomy can have unexpected and escalatory outcomes. For example, the 2010 stock market flash crash—which reduced the stock market value by one trillion dollars within a matter of minutes—was, according to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), enabled and amplified by the use (or misuse) of autonomous financial trading algorithms.7 Unlike the financial markets, however, there is no overarch¬ing authority in international relations to enforce pre-programmed fail-safe mech¬anisms based on a shared set of rules. Thus, the prospect of a flash crash-like event occurring in adversarial, loosely regulated, offense-dominant, and strategically competitive domains, such as cyberspace, missile defense, or anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), is especially alarming. Military AI systems functioning at machine speed could push the pace of combat to a point where the actions of machines eclipse the ability of human decision-makers to control (or even comprehend) events. In extremis, human commanders might lose control of the outbreak, course, and termination of warfare. Were humans to effectively lose (or pre-delegate) control of warfare to machines, inadvertent escalation pathways and crisis instability would increase, potentially with catastrophic results.8 Compelled by the speed and pre¬cision of AI to make decisions in a compressed timeframe, a state might accept higher risks and escalate a conflict with the belief it was in a use it or lose it situation, or a lack of confidence in its ability to guarantee the safety and control of its nuclear arsenals.9

#### 2. Emerging technologies won’t lead to arms control—nations value their nuclear weapons too highly.

Michal Onderco & Madeline Zutt 21 Associate Professor, International Relations, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Research Associate, Erasmus University Rotterdam, "Emerging Technology and Nuclear Security: What Does the Wisdom of The Crowd Tell Us?" Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 42, Issue 3, pg. 299-302, 2021, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963>, Retrieved 3/30/2022)

Table 3. Nuclear disarmament and emerging technologies. CSVDisplay Table Given that experts and policymakers agreed that emerging technologies are unlikely to carry out strategic tasks, it is perhaps not surprising that they also believed that emerging technologies are unlikely to supplant nuclear weapons. This is reflected in the fact that most experts disagreed that complete nuclear disarmament would occur when leaders believe emerging technologies will make nuclear weapons unnecessary. This finding strongly suggests that the value of nuclear weapons goes beyond their roles as deterrents. Some decision-makers agreed, noting that not only are nuclear weapons the “ultimate security guarantor” (Interviewee F) but they are also seen as a guarantor of independence and sovereignty (Interviewee B). These views support the existing literature: Scholars have long recognized the symbolic value of nuclear weapons, going well beyond their military utility (Abraham, 1998; Harrington de Santana, 2009; Hecht, 2012; Sagan, 1996). The view that emerging technologies are unlikely to supplant nuclear weapons also reflects the difficulty of verifying and monitoring the nuclear weapon ban. These difficulties have been broadly recognized. Some scholars are positive about the potential future normative developments (Considine, 2019; Egeland, 2018; Ritchie, 2019), others see risks associated with looking at the nuclear weapon ban and disarmament from an arms control perspective (Onderco, 2017; Müller, 2020).

#### 3. TURN: AI increases nations vulnerability to cyber-attacks.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

It is now thought to be possible that a cyberattack could infiltrate a nuclear weapons system, threaten the integrity of its communications, and ultimately (possibly unbeknownst to its target) gain control of its nuclear as well as non¬nuclear command and control systems. Advances in AI might, therefore, exacer¬bate this challenge by enabling improvements to the cyber offense, thereby con¬ferring further advantages to first movers in this domain.14 For example, machine learning and AI could dramatically reduce the high levels of labor inten¬sity and technical skill required to execute advanced persistent threat (APT) oper¬ations—or “hunting for weaknesses.”15 Future AI APT tools could offer a would-be attacker a cheap and easy way to replicate powerful cyber weapons, which would require minimal technical knowledge to employ. While manipulations and system subversions are possible with existing cyber offense tools, AI and increasing degrees of military autonomy could amplify the potential speed, power, and scale of future attacks in cyberspace. In response to these anticipated vulnerabilities and to achieve the first-mover advantage, China, Russia, and the United States have continued to harden their AI cyber defenses.16 For example, open sources indicate that Chinese analysts view the vul¬nerability of China’s nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems to cyber infiltrations as highly escalatory, even if an attacker’s objective was limited to cyber espionage.17 China’s fear that its early-warning missile systems are inadequate to respond to a disarming first strike by the United States has prompted Beijing to prioritize mitigating false negatives, when early-warning systems fail to warn of an imminent attack (as opposed to a false positive that warns of an attack that does not exist).18 AI-enhanced cyber capabilities sim¬ultaneously bolstering deterrence and incentivizing others to attack could intensify a paradox of enhanced capabilities and increased vulnerabilities in the cyber domain.

#### 4. Arms control is already strong…The NPT has already created powerful norms against proliferation, strong verification systems, and has moved the world toward nuclear disarmament.

Robert Einhorn, 3/30/2020 (Senior Fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, “Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/03/experts-assess-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-50-years-after-it-went-into-effect/>, Retrieved 3/30/2022)

As we mark the 50th anniversary of the NPT’s entry into force, there is much to celebrate. Without the treaty, the powerful norm against proliferation it created, its associated controls on exports of sensitive technologies, the rigorous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring system, and the threat of sanctions for violating nonproliferation obligations, we would be living in the world of many nuclear-armed states that President John F. Kennedy predicted. As Mike points out, today there are only nine countries with nuclear weapons, the same number as 25 years ago — a remarkable indication of the NPT’s durability and its contribution to international stability. Without the treaty, and the confidence provided by its IAEA verification system that nuclear equipment and materials would not be diverted to the production of nuclear weapons, the widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would not have been possible — not just for electricity generation, but also for the production of isotopes for use in medicine, agriculture, and industry. While the NPT’s central goal was to prevent additional nuclear-armed states, it sought to assure non-nuclear weapon states (who were required to renounce nuclear arms) that the asymmetry between them and the five original nuclear powers (who were allowed to keep their nuclear weapons) would not last forever. It therefore obligated the five — China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. — to make “good faith” efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In the last 50 years, the United States and the USSR/Russia have made huge progress toward nuclear disarmament, reducing their nuclear weapons inventories by close to 90% from Cold War levels. Mike is right that they pursued nuclear arms limitations and reductions primarily because they believed such arms agreements would serve their own security interests, not because they were obliged to do so under the NPT. But Mike is also right that the NPT helped create the stable strategic framework in which such agreements were acceptable to the superpowers. And the desire of Washington and Moscow to ensure the success of the treaty and its nonproliferation goal gave them additional incentive to pursue nuclear disarmament.

### Extensions #1: Accidents

#### AI destabilizes nuclear stability—risking escalation to all out nuclear war.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

The destabilizing conditions that AI could impose have the potential to under¬mine global nuclear (or strategic) stability. The concept of nuclear or strategic stability emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century, and despite being theoretically and politically contested to this day, it has proven a useful intellec¬tual tool for analyzing the potential of technically advanced weapons to under¬mine stability. While strategic stability has no single, universally accepted definition, contributing factors, or even agreed-upon metrics to measure it,33 it can be best thought of as a situation wherein no country has incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—thus reducing the danger of a crisis caused by miscal¬culation or misperception escalating into all-out war.34 It is ultimately a product of a complex interplay of political, economic, and military dynamics in which tech¬nology performs several functions.35 The role of technological change and stra¬tegic stability is part of a complex interaction of disruptive forces which, during periods of heightened geopolitical rivalry, great power transitions, and strategic surprise, may erode strategic stability and make conflict more likely.36 Two existing conditions for nuclear instability likely to be exacerbated by AI are nuclear multipolarity and differing escalation risk tolerance between military powers. The coalescing of these conditions in the presence of the inherently desta¬bilizing military AI systems, described earlier, will lead to an interplay of forces ripe for mis¬calculations and misperceptions between nuclear-armed states, increasing the dangers of escalation and deterrence failure under the nuclear shadow.

#### AI increases the risk of miscalculation.

Mark Fitzpatrick, 2019 (former deputy assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation, “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Command and Control,” Survival, June-July 2019)

The QuantumAI aspect of the exercise was one manifestation of what the background paper described as a ‘black box model extraction’ vulner-ability. Such an extraction reverse-engineers an AI system to determine its parameters. An adversary may be able to use this information to enhance the effectiveness of future operations against the system by stealing intel-lectual property; identifying sensitive or proprietary information related to the system’s training data or objectives; or developing ‘adversarial inputs’ to be covertly introduced into the original AI system. Such inputs confuse the system’s classifiers or its pattern-recognition function, thereby causing it to miscalculate, misclassify or misinterpret elements in its oper¬ational environment.

#### AI capabilities in military situations increase the risk of inadvertent escalation and instability.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

A broader point here is that under crisis and conflict conditions, the deterrent effect of AI is predicated on the perceived risks associated with a particular capa¬bility it enables or enhances. The higher the uncertainty generated by a capacity, deploying AI-augmented capabilities in a crisis might actually encourage an adversary to act more cautiously, and in turn, bolster stability. Thus, the uncertainty caused by the introduction of AI into a situation might incentivize states (especially those facing a superior adversary) to delegate decisions to machines for the per¬ceived deterrence effect.26 Because of the diffi¬culty of demonstrating a posture like this before a crisis or conflict, however, this implicit threat could equally worsen crisis instability. AI systems that are pro¬grammed to aggressively pursue tactical and operational advantages, for example, might misperceive (or ignore) an adversary’s bid to deescalate a situation as prelude to an imminent attack. These dynamics would increase the risks of inad¬vertent escalation and first-strike instability.27

#### AI won’t have a stabilizing impact on nuclear relations between states.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

In a world of revisionist and dissatisfied nuclear-armed states, it seems improb¬able that improvements in intelligence collection and analysis derived from advances in AI would have a stabilizing impact.43 For this to happen, equal access to intelligence and shared confidence in the accuracy and credibility of these systems would be required. Furthermore, the intentions of all parties would need to be benign for any reassurances or confidence-building efforts to succeed. Because nuclear interactions increasingly involve the complex interplay of nuclear and non-nuclear (and state and non-state) actors, the leveraging of AI in this multipolar context will increasingly place destabilizing pressures on nuclear states. Taken together, these interactions will likely complicate escalation man¬agement efforts during future crises or conflict—especially involving China and the United States.

#### AI integration into military systems is inherently destabilizing.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

Non-human decision-making As AI systems become more integrated into the strategic decision-making process, the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with military autonomy will likely increase. According to former DARPA director Arati Prabhakar, despite AI’s potential tactical and operational impact, the technology remains “fundamentally limited” due to its propensity to misidentify objects and be easily spoofed.19 Prab¬hakar adds that decision-making errors committed by AI systems are often inex¬plicable and unlike errors humans would make. In one example, Prabhakar demonstrated how a picture of a baby holding a toothbrush was misidentified by a machine-learning algorithm as a baby with a baseball bat.20 Unpredictable errors and decisions made by AI systems deployed at scale and across multiple domains and combat theaters would be inherently destabilizing.21

#### The risk of nuclear accidents is extremely low—nuclear armed nations have spent vast sums of money trying to prevent them.

Michael Horowitz, Dec. 2019, (Political Science Prof @ University of Pennsylvania, “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence,” Retrieved Apr. 28, 2022 from <https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05291>)

Furthermore, as Albert Wohlstetter found, the threat of mutual destruction “offer[ed] every inducement to both powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.”11 While there are no known instances of accidental war, there are historical examples of unintended escalation, either in pre-conflict crises or once a conflict is underway.12 Accidental escalation is when a state unintentionally commits an escalatory act (i.e. due to technical malfunction, human error, or incomplete control over military forces).13 Inadvertent escalation can also occur, whereby a state unknowingly commits an escalatory act (i.e., an intentional act that unknowingly crossing an adversary’s red line).14 Accidents have increased tensions between countries on numerous occasions, but have not led to escalation.15 Nuclear-armed states have expended vast resources to minimize the risk of unintentional escalation, knowing that it could lead to catastrophe should it occur.

### Extensions #2: Emerging Tech Won’t Lead to Arms Control

#### Conflicts have to be solved for nuclear disarmament to become feasible--

Michal Onderco & Madeline Zutt 21—Associate Professor, International Relations, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Research Associate, Erasmus University Rotterdam, "Emerging Technology and Nuclear Security: What Does the Wisdom of The Crowd Tell Us?" Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 42, Issue 3, pg. 299-302, 2021, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963>, Retrieved 3/30/2022)

There has been an increase in debates on nuclear disarmament, spurred by developments such as the Humanitarian Initiative giving rise to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Among deterrence experts, these debates have ushered in discussions on the conditions necessary for nuclear disarmament. Roberts (2019) notes that some of these conditions include the resolution of regional geopolitical conflicts that encourage adversarial states to acquire nuclear weapons, more sophisticated verification measures and increased transparency of nuclear capabilities. The recent U.S.-led initiative on Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament echoes many of these views (Gibbons, 2019). Müller (2020) argues that nuclear disarmament “will lead to the desired result only when it is embedded in a supporting institutional framework” (p. 151). Importantly, Müller recognizes that in order for non-nuclear peace to be achieved “the real, alleged or perceived war-prevention functions of nuclear deterrence” would have to “be taken over by other means” (pp. 151–152). To be sure, there is much less research on emerging technologies and nuclear disarmament through the substitution path, even though the replacement of nuclear weapons has been, as we indicated above, on the agenda for decades.

### Extensions #3: Cyber-Attack Defense

#### No impact to cyber-attacks:

Lewis 20 (James Andrew Lewis is a senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," Center for Strategic and International Studies. August 2020. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe>)

A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack. To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With man-made actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge. It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted. More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare. State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war. This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation. The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability. One major failing of catastrophe scenarios is that they discount the robustness and resilience of modern economies. These economies present multiple targets and configurations; they are harder to damage through cyberattack than they look, given the growing (albeit incomplete) attention to cybersecurity; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild. This was one of the counterintuitive lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Pre-war planning assumed that civilian morale and production would crumple under aerial bombardment. In fact, the opposite occurred. Resistance hardened and production was restored.1

#### No cyber-attacks versus critical infrastructure:

Taylor Armerding, 4/15/2016 (contributing writer, “Catastrophic cyber attack on U.S. grid possible, but not likely,” <https://www.csoonline.com/article/3055718/catastrophic-cyber-attack-on-u-s-grid-possible-but-not-likely.html>, Retrieved 4/1/2022)

Catastrophic cyber attack on U.S. grid possible, but not likely Anything is possible in the cat-and-mouse game of probing and protecting the online weaknesses of the nation’s critical infrastructure. But security experts say the U.S. grid is resilient enough to make a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” highly unlikely Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Share on LinkedIn Share on Reddit Share by Email Print resource Taylor Armerding By Taylor Armerding Contributing writer, CSO | APR 15, 2016 3:45 AM PDT power transmission towers David R. Tribble (Creative Commons BY or BY-SA) Warnings about U.S. critical infrastructure’s vulnerabilities to a catastrophic cyber attack – a cyber “Pearl Harbor” or “9/11” – began more than 25 years ago. But they have become more insistent and frequent over the past decade. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned in a 2012 speech of both a “cyber Pearl Harbor” and a “pre-9/11 moment.” They have also expanded from within the security industry to the mass media. It was almost a decade ago, in 2007, that the Idaho National Laboratory demonstrated that a cyber attack could destroy an enormous diesel power generator – an event featured in a 2009 segment on the CBS news magazine “60 Minutes.” [ Keep up with 8 hot cybersecurity trends (and 4 going cold). Give your career a boost with top security certifications: Who they're for, what they cost, and which you need. | Sign up for CSO newsletters. ] Late last year, retired “Nightline” anchor Ted Koppel warned in his book "Lights Out" of possible catastrophe – thousands of deaths – if the U.S. grid is ever taken down by a major cyber attack. And just this month, the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched a national campaign to warn U.S. utilities and the public about the danger from cyber attacks like the one last December that took down part of Ukraine’s power grid. The worst-case scenario, according to some experts and officials, is that major portions of the grid could go down for months, or even a year. Yet, nothing close to that has happened yet – the damage over the past decade from natural disasters like hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes has been much more significant than any cyber events. [ Learn how IT can harness the power and promise of 5G in this FREE CIO Roadmap Report. Download now! ] All of which raise the obvious question: Why? If a hostile nation state like Iran could deal the “Great Satan” a crippling blow, why wouldn’t it? There are several theories to explain it. One is that even countries like Iran or a rogue state like North Korea would not want to take down the U.S. economy because it would have a drastic negative effect on the world economy. “The same interdependencies that exist in the global economy could have unintended global consequences, were any nation to suffer widespread disruption to foundational systems,” said Anthony Di Bello, director of strategic partnerships for Guidance Software. If any large country truly becomes a national security threat to another large country (a cyber attack) may well be far more likely than it would be in today's climate. anthonydibelloAnthony Di Bello, director, strategic partnerships, Guidance Software Another is that hostile nation states are more interested in espionage than an attack, in the hope that knowledge of U.S. infrastructure systems will give them some leverage in foreign policy disputes, or prevent a country like the U.S. from ever attacking them with conventional weapons. The Never-ending Story of Emotet and the Dangers for Financial Services SponsoredPost Sponsored by Akamai The Never-ending Story of Emotet and the Dangers for Financial Services Emotet, described as among the most dangerous types of malware for financial services organizations, has returned. Yet another is that if other countries are inside U.S. systems, the U.S. must be inside of theirs, which creates the equivalent of a cyber “balance of terror” – the U.S. could do as much or more damage to them in response to an attack. As Jason Healey, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, put it, “cyber deterrence is working. They (hostile nation states) haven’t attacked our cyber systems for many of the same reason they haven’t sent nuclear-tipped missiles: They have no reason to unless the world is in a serious crisis, not least because they know there would be a dangerous counterattack from the U.S.” Indeed, there is general agreement that destructive cyber attacks are unlikely unless hostile nations are heading into war – an armed conflict. Cyber deterrence is working. They (hostile nation states) haven’t attacked our cyber systems for many of the same reason they haven’t sent nuclear-tipped missiles. jasonhealeyJason Healey, senior fellow, the Atlantic Council “If any large country truly becomes a national security threat to another large country it may well be far more likely than it would be in today's climate,” Di Bello said. “Barring that, it would be unlikely.” For that reason, major cyber attacks are much more likely in areas where there is already armed conflict, or the potential for it. Robert M. Lee, cofounder of Dragos Security and a former U.S Air Force cyber warfare operations officer, noted that the attack on Ukraine’s grid, widely attributed to Russia, was, “simply an extension of what was going on with the military. That, he said, would increase the likelihood of attacks between countries like North and South Korea, or between Iran and Israel – “traditional conflict areas,” as he put it. Of course that leaves out terrorist organizations that don’t represent any nation state and which give no indication that it would trouble them at all to take down the world economy. [ MORE: Protecting vital electricity infrastructure ] SponsoredPost Sponsored by HPE Take Your IT Asset Management to the Next Level Here are 6 best practices for improving the efficiency of your IT asset management strategy. But Lee and other experts said this week that smaller organizations – even lethal terrorist groups like ISIS – don't have the same capability as nation states. They say while the U.S. grid and other industrial control systems (ICS) have significant weaknesses – and U.S. adversaries are constantly probing those weaknesses – launching an effective, sustained attack is not as easy as some people, including high government officials, suggest. “It is significantly more difficult to do a high-confidence attack on ICS than people think,” Lee said “It doesn’t just involve the cyber component – it’s the engineering piece as well.” Al Berman, president of Disaster Recovery Institute, agreed. He said one reason is that, over the past decade, there has been “tremendous sharing” about threat information among utility companies. The ICS ISAC (Information Sharing and Analysis Center) is “enormously strong,” he said. A second is that most ICSs are not completely automated. “The big ones still require manual intervention,” he said. “There are manual bypasses occurring all the time – people are manning centers around the clock.” That, he said, makes it more difficult for attackers to get control of a system remotely. Third, he said, is that most utilities are privately owned and have different software, applications and system designs. That diversity makes it much more difficult to launch a coordinated attack on multiple systems. Dr. Paul Stockton, managing director at Sonecon, made that point in a recent paper titled “Superstorm Sandy: Implications for designing a post-cyber attack power restoration system.” He wrote that the diversity of systems would likely impede recovery efforts after a major attack, but would also have the benefit of making large-scale attacks much more difficult in the first place. We’re in an arms race. We continue to strengthen resilience, but we need to accelerate our efforts to defend and respond. paulstocktonDr. Paul Stockton, managing director, Sonecon “The enormous diversity of ICS software and control system components among utilities greatly complicates the task of conducting a ‘single-stroke’ attack to black out an entire interconnect or the U.S. grid as a whole,” he wrote. And according to Lee, even with all that diversity, critical infrastructure systems are relatively simple to defend. “They are among the few networks on the planet that are defensible,” he said. Added to that, said Lila Kee, chief product officer at GlobalSign, is that utility providers are very much aware of the threats, and highly motivated to defend against them. “Grid providers don’t want to be any more regulated than they are, and they understand if they don’t address cyber security vulnerabilities, the government will do it for them,” she said. “It’s also important to note that grid providers have a self interest around protecting generation and transmission systems.” Grid providers have a self interest around protecting generation and transmission systems. lilakeeLila Kee, chief product officer, GlobalSign Berman contends that “the mundane things – like cable backhoes – cause us more problems than cyber.” While the risks are real, “I spend a lot of time with utility people,” he said, “and they are dedicated and understand where attacks are taking place. I tend to be an optimist – I’m not so sure we’re as ill-prepared as everybody thinks.” All this, experts hasten to add, does not mean that ICS defenses are adequate. As has been noted many times, they were not originally designed to face the Internet. And the interconnection of ICS networks to gain automation and efficiency has simply expanded the attack surface. And, as both Lee and Stockton note, if there is a major cyber attack, responding to it will be much more complicated than to a natural disaster like Superstorm Sandy. In that case, other providers who came to assist those that had been damaged by the storm, knew they would not confront the same storm themselves. With a cyber attack, as Lee put it, “the adversary will be fighting your responders,” in much the same way that terrorist groups sometimes detonate one bomb, wait for others to rush in to assist victims, and then detonate another one. The most crucial point, Lee said, is that, “everything that everyone is talking about is speculation, because we’ve never seen it (a major attack).” Another problem he sees is that there were no collective, international warnings to the perpetrators of the Ukraine attack. “We didn’t even have to say we knew who did it,” he said, “but we should have said that whoever did it, be warned that this is an unacceptable act that will bring severe consequences. “This was an attack on a completely civilian infrastructure, and now it is seen as permissible. It’s going to embolden attackers.” Stockton also warns that while terrorist organizations may lack the capability to launch a crippling cyber attack now, that may not always be true. “They have access to Dark Web and zero days to increasing extent,” he said. “And they are becoming increasingly sophisticated. We’re in an arms race. We continue to strengthen resilience, but we need to accelerate our efforts to defend and respond.” Lee agreed, saying that while things are improving in securing critical infrastructure, “it’s not happening nearly as fast as it should be.”

### Extensions #4: NPT Solving Now

#### Extend that the NPT is solving now—there’s been a tiny amount of proliferation and the major powers have massively slashed their arsenals…proving the status quo solves the case…

#### Nuclear proliferation is in check and the NPT is tightening its inspection regimes:

Frank A. Rose, 3/3/2020 (Senior Fellow, Security and Strategy, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, “Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/03/experts-assess-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-50-years-after-it-went-into-effect/>, Retrieved 3/30/2022)

The arsenals of the United States and Russia still account for more than 90% of the total number of warheads on Earth today. The United Kingdom, France, China, India, and Pakistan each likely possesses between 150 and 300, with Israel’s unconfirmed arsenal totaling almost 100 bombs. North Korea probably has a couple dozen nuclear weapons, with enough fissile material to make a few dozen more. That said, the situation is not entirely grim. While nuclear proliferation continues, and nine countries are known to possess nuclear weapons, the fear once expressed by John F. Kennedy that at least a couple dozen countries could have the bomb by the 21st century has not panned out. And of course, nuclear weapons have not been used again in combat. An additional achievement, for which a few of my colleagues here deserve some of the credit, is the tightening of inspection regimens under the NPT. In particular, the so-called “Additional Protocol” has created the right for inspectors to go to places where they suspect monkey business, even if those sites are not officially declared by the country in question. This arrangement tends to work only if national intelligence capabilities, and/or whistleblowers, provide information about suspicious activities. But at that point, inspectors can be more effective than in the years before the Additional Protocol concept was developed and legitimated. It has helped make the nuclear inspections in the Iran nuclear deal much more effective (even if other aspects of that deal have proven highly controversial). A similar concept would almost surely be used in any nuclear deal with North Korea in the years ahead.

#### NPT is successful now:

Michael O'Hanlon, 3/3/2020 (Director of Research and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program @ Brookings Institution, “Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/03/experts-assess-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-50-years-after-it-went-into-effect/>, Retrieved 3/30/2022)

Michael O'Hanlon headshotMichael O’Hanlon (@MichaelEOhanlon), Director of Research and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program: There are still more than 10,000 nuclear warheads on Earth. But I think the NPT, on balance, has been enormously successful. Current arsenals are big, but they are only about one-fifth the size of what they were a half-century ago. While superpower arms control, and the end of the Cold War, deserve most of the credit for the reductions (along with restraint by China, in particular, in not building up too much), the NPT created some of the broader political context and moral pressure that led to these reductions. While it sought to prevent non-nuclear states from ever getting the bomb, its main bargain also required the existing nuclear weapons states to reduce and ultimately eliminate their arsenals to hold up their own ends of the bargain.

## Solvency

### 1NC — Solvency

#### 1. NATO standards are ineffective in establishing interoperability on AI.

Erica Pepe, 2020 (Senior Coordinator for Research and Conflict, Security and Development Analyst, “NATO and collective thinking on AI,” <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/11/nato-artificial-intelligence>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

NATO could play an important role in establishing interoperability standards and norms of use in the military application of artificial intelligence. But will allies be able to adopt a common approach in the use of AI for defence and security and keep the Western technological edge? By the end of 2020, NATO may have in place broad thinking on artificial intelligence (AI) as part of a wider implementation strategy on how to benefit from emerging technologies. The Alliance could play an important role in establishing interoperability standards along with supporting norms of use in the military application of AI. NATO, however, has not always been successful in establishing standards, nor in getting member states to comply. This makes the recently set-up NATO Innovation Board, and its intended year-end emerging-technologies implementation strategy, potentially all the more important. An AI White Paper, including a proposed five-year roadmap, is already with Alliance governments, having been submitted in July. This could lead to a more detailed NATO AI strategy emerging sometime in 2021. The AI challenge The Alliance has the advantage of having 30 members spending some US$1 trillion (2020) on defence. Its wide membership, however, is also a possible weakness if even a top-level common approach to AI cannot be agreed. The Innovation Board’s chair, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană, has the task of coordinating ongoing AI-related work across the Alliance in attempting to shape a shared vision of how to utilise AI. This will include working to identify capability needs and potential projects for collaboration. NATO already has some AI-related projects under way, including the Military Uses of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and Robotics project and the NATO Data Science Centre. The former project is part of the United States-led Multinational Capability Development Campaign and is intended to look at possible applications in areas such as air and missile defence. The Data Science Centre’s aim is to bring together existing data-science expertise within NATO under one structure. The Alliance views AI as one of several of what it calls ‘emerging and disruptive technologies’, which it considers will likely have the greatest impact in combination. NATO’s March 2020 ‘Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040’ report pointed to the mix of autonomy, big data and AI, for example being used to generate decision-relevant information from vast quantities of raw data, as having far-reaching implications for defence and security. The report also identified an array of ‘serious challenges’ that NATO faces in managing AI, including policy, legal, ethical and interoperability issues. It further identified the need for a common approach to how the performance of AI-software-based systems is verified, and in turn how the verification process is itself validated. In some ways NATO might seem a natural forum for these deliberations, not least in a transatlantic context. It also has a lot of experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces: not only 30 members with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and potential adversaries may hold significant advantages. Interoperability issues may be thorny, but they need to be resolved if AI-dependent capability gaps between members are not to widen. Early discussions regarding the establishment of common technical standards on the design and development of military-applicable AI would at least reduce this risk.

#### 2. US-European cooperation on AI faces numerous obstacles.

Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey, 2020, (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence,” <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-intelligence>, Retrieved 6/12/2022)

Challenges to Collaboration & Recommendations Full US-EU collaboration faces five distinct, but interconnected obstacles (see Figure 1 below). At the highest level, the United States and European Union have some diverging geopolitical interests (section A) illustrated by: America’s increasing isolationism, the European Union’s rebalancing to become a third power, the European Union’s resistance to adversarial discourse about China, and domestic political demands to focus resources on COVID-19 responses. Flowing out of the geopolitical landscape and political interests are three overarching considerations that are bolstered by differing beliefs about the role and size of government and can fuel US-EU disagreements around AI. These US national interests and EU common priorities are (section B): AI’s impact on national security and economic interests, as well as the ethics and values that guide AI’s development and use. Finally, aspects of the AI operating environment (sections C, D, and E), such as regulation and governance (including standards and operationalizing principles), funding, data spaces, hardware, and computing resources, provide tactical areas for disagreement or misalignment.

#### 3. NATO norms alone will fail—China and Russia must come to the table.

John R. Allen, 3/24/2021 (President of the Brookings Institution, “It is time to negotiate global treaties on artificial intelligence,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/03/24/it-is-time-to-negotiate-global-treaties-on-artificial-intelligence/>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, and other regional security alliances are undertaking consultations designed to create agreed-to norms and policies on AI and other new technologies. This includes effort to design ethical principles for AI that govern algorithmic development and deployment and provide guardrails for economic and military actions. For these agreements to be fully implemented though, they will need to have the active participation and support of China and Russia as well as other relevant states. For just as it was during the Cold War, logic should dictate that potential adversaries be at the negotiating table in the fashioning of these agreements. Otherwise, democratic countries will end up in a situation where they are self-constrained but adversaries are not.

## Answers to Add-Ons

### A2: Democracy Add-on

#### Studies prove that democratic peace theory is flawed:

Femke E. Bakker, 4/20/2020 (assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science @ Leiden University, “The microfoundations of normative democratic peace theory. Experiments in the US, Russia and China,” <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2474736X.2020.1753084>, Retrieved 8/4/2021)

Democratic peace theory is built on the assumption that liberal-democracy has a pacifying effect on people, a socialization process that is assumed to lack within autocracies. This paper uses an experimental approach to investigate the microfoundations of democratic peace theory among decision-makers of the US, Russia and China. It builds on and extents previous experimental studies by conceptualizing and measuring the presence and influence of liberal norms, by controlling for the perception of threat as induced by the conflict, and by testing the influence of hawkishness. The results show that the microfoundations of democratic peace theories do not find support. Neither regime-type, nor liberal norms are of influence on the willingness to attack the opponent, and also the assumed difference in liberal norms between individuals of different regime types is unsupported. Moreover, hawkish decision-makers are more likely to go to war. The results show that democratic peace theory, which aims to explain why democracies do not fight with each other, cannot be used as has been done till today and should be revised. The paper concludes with suggestions for new research avenues.

#### Democratic peace theory is flawed:

Kathrine Lane, 7/21/2020 (Government Contract Specialist Coordinator at Insight Global, “Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory: Summary,” <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/flawed-logic-democratic-peace-theory-summary-kathrine-lane>, Retrieved 8/4/2021)

The article “Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory” by Sebastian Rosato, offers a new perspective on the logic behind the democratic peace theory. The author first explains the literal definition behind the theory itself. Theorist believe that with the increase of democracies, there will be a decrease of the probability of war. They also believe that it is important to spread the ideology of democracy. Reason for decrease of war relies on two main factors: norm-externalization and trust and respect. Meaning that because they trust and respect other democracies, they are willing to work with each other to mend any conflicts. Rosato debunks this myth by providing historical examples like the Cold War and the Great Powers. The Democratic Peace Theory continues on to explain that non-democratic countries are neither trusted or respected. Non-democratic countries are not respected because their domestic system is deemed unjust in the eyes of democracies. “Extreme lack of public respect or trust is one of the major features that distinguishes re- lations between liberal and nonliberal societies from relations among liberal societies.” In addition, nondemocratic countries are often more likely to extract power by attacking or using harsh forces. An important yet tragic example of this was displayed in Tiananmen Square in China. War was another topic that Rosato related democratic peace theory to. Rosato explained that democratic countries will often fight non-democratic counties but they still remain at peace with one another. Democratic Peace Theory also claims that there are far fewer reasons to go to war when there are more democracies but it’s important to note that they justify war in cases where their country’s safety is at risk. Rosato debunks this claim by mentioning Germany and the United States conflict in World War II. As Germany progressively changed their beliefs and policies, the relationship between Germany and the United States started to diminish. American leaders justified the war on Germany because they stopped viewing Germany as a democracy. This contradicts the claim of the Democratic Peace Theory. This proves that whether or not a country was a democracy was not a determinant for foreign affairs and relations. This also proves that there is no clear definition of a true “democratic” country because affairs and opinions are constantly changing. Rosato provides concrete details that war and opposing opinions are going to occur whether or not a country is a democracy. No two countries are in fact the exactly the same, therefore they will not always come to an equal verdict on issues, causing a repercussion that sometimes lead to war, famine or new polices implemented. Personally, I thoroughly enjoyed reading this article, in fact it is one of my favorites. The theory of democratic peace comes from an idea with historical background. As a logical thinker, I enjoy looking at supporting evidence when forming an opinion. Thus, I enjoyed hearing Rosato argument. Rosato used many cases of historical evidence to support his claim that the Democratic Peace Theory has no true supporting evidence. I also enjoyed how he mentioned that public opinion is not a determinate on whether or not democracies will go to war, because if democracies did care about public opinion then they would care about being peaceful and having good relationships with all countries not just other democracies. This is an interesting point but also very valid. Often times democratic countries only communicate with other democratic counties, and if they do communicate with nondemocratic counties, they do it in an effort of forcing their views on other countries. Two great examples of this that I can think of are Vietnam and more recently in Libya.

### A2: NATO Add-on

#### NATO doesn’t solve conflict—just makes war more likely:

MEDEA BENJAMIN, 12/6/2019 (co-founder of CODEPINK for Peace, “Why NATO should be obsolete,” <https://www.salon.com/2019/12/06/nato-should-be-obsolete_partner/>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The three smartest words that Donald Trump uttered during his presidential campaign are “NATO is obsolete.” His adversary, Hillary Clinton, retorted that NATO was “the strongest military alliance in the history of the world.” Now that Trump has been in power, the White House parrots the same worn line that NATO is “the most successful Alliance in history, guaranteeing the security, prosperity, and freedom of its members.” But Trump was right the first time around: Rather than being a strong alliance with a clear purpose, this 70-year-old organization that is meeting in London on December 4 is a stale military holdover from the Cold War days that should have gracefully retired many years ago. NATO was originally founded by the United States and 11 other Western nations as an attempt to curb the rise of communism in 1949. Six years later, Communist nations founded the Warsaw Pact and through these two multilateral institutions, the entire globe became a Cold War battleground. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the Warsaw Pact disbanded but NATO expanded, growing from its original 12 members to 29 member countries. North Macedonia, set to join next year, will bring the number to 30. NATO has also expanded well beyond the North Atlantic, adding a partnership with Colombia in 2017. Donald Trump recently suggested that Brazil could one day become a full member. NATO’s post-Cold War expansion toward Russia’s borders, despite earlier promises not to move eastward, has led to rising tensions between Western powers and Russia, including multiple close calls between military forces. It has also contributed to a new arms race, including upgrades in nuclear arsenals, and the largest NATO “war games” since the Cold War. While claiming to “preserve peace,” NATO has a history of bombing civilians and committing war crimes. In 1999, NATO engaged in military operations without UN approval in Yugoslavia. Its illegal airstrikes during the Kosovo War left hundreds of civilians dead. And far from the “North Atlantic,” NATO joined the United States in invading Afghanistan in 2001, where it is still bogged down two decades later. In 2011, NATO forces illegally invaded Libya, creating a failed state that caused masses of people to flee. Rather than take responsibility for these refugees, NATO countries have turned back desperate migrants on the Mediterranean Sea, letting thousands die. In London, NATO wants to show it is ready to fight new wars. It will showcase its readiness initiative—the ability to deploy 30 battalions by land, 30 air squadrons and 30 naval vessels in just 30 days, and to confront future threats from China and Russia, including with hypersonic missiles and cyberwarfare. But far from being a lean, mean war machine, NATO is actually riddled with divisions and contradictions. Here are some of them: French President Emmanuel Macron questions the U.S. commitment to fight for Europe, has called NATO “brain dead” and has proposed a European Army under the nuclear umbrella of France. Turkey has enraged NATO members with its incursion into Syria to attack the Kurds, who have been Western allies in the fight against ISIS. And Turkey has threatened to veto a Baltic defense plan until allies support its controversial incursion into Syria. Turkey has also infuriated NATO members, especially Trump, by purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile system. Trump wants NATO to push back against China’s growing influence, including the use of Chinese companies for the construction of 5G mobile networks—something many NATO countries are unwilling to do. Is Russia really NATO’s adversary? France’s Macron has reached out to Russia, inviting Putin to discuss ways in which the European Union can put the Crimean invasion behind it. Donald Trump has publicly attacked Germany over its Nord Stream 2 project to pipe in Russian gas, but a recent German poll saw 66 percent wanting closer ties with Russia. The UK has bigger problems. Britain has been convulsed over the Brexit conflict and is holding a contentious national election on December 12. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, knowing that Trump is wildly unpopular, is reluctant to be seen as close to him. Also, Johnson’s major contender, Jeremy Corbyn, is a reluctant supporter of NATO. While his Labour Party is committed to NATO, over his career as an anti-war champion, Corbyn has called NATO “a danger to world peace and a danger to world security.” The last time Britain hosted NATO leaders in 2014, Corbyn told an anti-NATO rally that the end of the Cold War “should have been the time for NATO to shut up shop, give up, go home and go away.” A further complication is Scotland, which is home to a very unpopular Trident nuclear submarine base as part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. A new Labour government would need the support of the Scottish National Party. But its leader, Nicola Sturgeon, insists that a precondition for her party’s support is a commitment to close the base. Europeans can’t stand Trump (a recent poll found he is trusted by only 4 percent of Europeans!) and their leaders can’t rely on him. Allied leaders learn of presidential decisions that affect their interests via Twitter. The lack of coordination was clear in October, when Trump ignored NATO allies when he ordered U.S. special forces out of northern Syria, where they had been operating alongside French and British commandos against Islamic State militants. The U.S. unreliability has led the European Commission to draw up plans for a European “defense union” that will coordinate military spending and procurement. The next step may be to coordinate military actions separate from NATO. The Pentagon has complained about EU countries purchasing military equipment from each other instead of from the United States, and has called this defense union “a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defence sector.” Do Americans really want to go to war for Estonia? Article 5 of the Treaty states that an attack against one member “shall be considered an attack against them all,” meaning that the treaty obligates the U.S. to go to war on behalf of 28 nations—something most likely opposed by war-weary Americans who want a less aggressive foreign policy that focuses on peace, diplomacy, and economic engagement instead of military force. An additional major bone of contention is who will pay for NATO. The last time NATO leaders met, President Trump derailed the agenda by berating NATO countries for not paying their fair share, and at the London meeting, Trump is expected to announce symbolic U.S. cuts to NATO’s operations budget. Trump’s main concern is that member states step up to the NATO target of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense by 2024, a goal that is unpopular among Europeans, who prefer that their tax dollars go to nonmilitary items. Nevertheless, NATOSecretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will brag that Europe and Canada have added $100 billion to their military budgets since 2016—something Donald Trump will take credit for—and that more NATO officials are meeting the 2 percent goal, even though a 2019 NATO report shows only seven members have done so: the U.S., Greece, Estonia, the UK, Romania, Poland and Latvia. In an age where people around the world want to avoid war and to focus instead on the climate chaos that threatens future life on earth, NATO is an anachronism. It now accounts for about three-quarters of military spending and weapons dealing around the globe. Instead of preventing war, it promotes militarism, exacerbates global tensions and makes war more likely. This Cold War relic shouldn’t be reconfigured to maintain U.S. domination in Europe, or to mobilize against Russia or China, or to launch new wars in space. It should not be expanded, but disbanded. Seventy years of militarism is more than enough.

#### NATO is obsolete—not necessary to solve conflict.

Christian Whiton, 7/6/2018 (State Department senior advisor in the Donald Trump and George W. Bush administrations, “NATO Is Obsolete,” <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-obsolete-25167>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Despite endless searches for a new mission to justify its massive burden on U.S. taxpayers, NATO has failed to be of much use since then. As its boosters like to remind us, after 9/11, the alliance invoked its Article 5 mutual-defense provision on our behalf. But action from America’s allies did not follow the grandiose gesture—the NATO mission in Afghanistan relied mostly on U.S. forces and effectively failed. Today, the alliance’s bureaucrats and some member states spotlight a threat from Russia as a reason for keeping the organization alive, along with a laundry list of “train and equip” missions. Yet NATO members' defense budgets don't reflect a real sense of danger from Russia or anyone else. Among the twenty-nine members, only the United States is really serious about its Article 3 obligations to defend itself, spending approximately $700 billion or 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. No other NATO member comes close to this proportion, and the vast majority fail even to meet the modest, self-imposed requirement to devote at least 2 percent of GDP to defense. Britain and Poland are rare members that meet the 2 percent requirement. One of the worst free-riders is Canada, which spends just 1 percent of its GDP on security, amounting to $20 billion. Furthermore, Germany spends a similarly pathetic 1.2 percent. Compare that to non-NATO members facing real threats, some of which spend 5-10 percent of their GDPs on defense. These include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who must contend with Iran and spend nearly a combined $100 billion. Israel, which faces the same enemy, adds $15 billion to the equation. Despite protestations of poverty at a time when their economies have never been larger, NATO members are more than willing to rack up additional liabilities, knowing America has their back. Last year, the alliance welcomed Montenegro. It is now poised to admit the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which would mean the United States is pledged to defend a nation that devotes just $120 million per year to its own defense, not quite as much as the Cincinnati Police Department. But the reality is there is no truly capable Russian foe seriously threatening the West. Russia has one million uniformed personnel in its military, the world’s second-largest behind America, but the European Union could easily afford to match that with its combined $17 trillion economy—ten times larger than Russia’s. However, it needn’t bother as Moscow spends just $61 billion on its overwrought military, which doubles as an employment program. Russia’s Vladimir Putin has gotten the most from Russia’s military, occupying parts of Georgia and Ukraine and gaining influence in Syria by backing the Assad regime. Still, his success in all three cases rested heavily on surprises that Moscow seems unlikely to be able to repeat against prepared and adequately funded European militaries. Yer we should expect to hear none of this nuance at the NATO summit, as poohbahs of the dying old European political order gather to tut-tut President Trump in the alliance’s fancy new $1.4 billion headquarters, funded predominantly by American taxpayers. To get out of this abusive relationship, Trump should begin the process of limiting America's role in NATO. A good model is that of Sweden, which cooperates with NATO on some matters and not on others. Such an approach could allow joint training, but end the practice of having over-burdened U.S. taxpayers foot the bill for wealthy Europeans' security. As part of this plan, Trump could mothball U.S. bases in Europe and shift most resources spent there and in the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region, where China and Iran pose real threats to America—and against which NATO is irrelevant. Europe is prosperous and treats America like a patsy. Let it stand on its own.

### A2: North Korea Add-On

#### North Korea won’t escalate – it’s just saber rattling

**Waldman 20** – (Elliot, senior editor of World Politics Review, master’s degree in international relations and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a bachelor's degree in international affairs from the George Washington University, 6/19, “Why North Korea Blew Up Its Détente With the South,” [accessed 8/30/20], <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/28851/why-north-korea-blew-up-its-detente-with-the-south>, see)

What a difference two years makes. The spring and summer of 2018 saw an extraordinary rapprochement between the two Koreas, as their leaders held successive face-to-face meetings, culminating in a landmark visit by South Korean President Moon Jae-in to Pyongyang. **The flurry of diplomacy produced a number of joint declarations, agreements, hotlines and other confidence-building measures**, including an inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong, just 6 miles into North Korean territory from the Demilitarized Zone. It was the first full-time communication channel and served as a de facto embassy between the two sides, which are technically still at war having not signed a peace agreement after the Korean War ended in 1953. Much of the progress of the past two years came crashing down this week when North Korea used controlled explosives to destroy the liaison building, which had been largely unused since January due to the coronavirus pandemic. The blast, powerful enough to shatter windows of nearby buildings, was clearly designed to send a message. “The decision to demolish the liaison center is significant in the sense that it was done dramatically, and with finality,” Frank Aum, senior expert on North Korea at the United States Institute of Peace, said in an email. Pyongyang could have simply mothballed the building, he added, but the fact that it instead chose a path of no return “certainly suggests there are more provocations coming down the pike.” The move comes amid renewed efforts by the North to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. On June 8, Pyongyang cut off all communication lines with the South and announced that it would start treating its neighbor as an “enemy.” The supposed reason for its anger is a South Korean campaign, largely run by activists and defectors from the North, to send propaganda leaflets across the border via hydrogen balloons. The leaflets, which often describe Kim as a cartoonish dictator squandering his country’s resources on nuclear weapons, are a genuine irritant for a regime that views information control as paramount to its survival. Pyongyang claims the campaign violates a 2018 agreement between Moon and Kim to halt their respective propaganda efforts. In an effort to preserve good relations, South Korea has promised a thorough crackdown on those responsible, introducing a law to ban the leaflets and even suing some of the activists. The fact that those efforts did little to mollify North Korea suggests that ultimately, Kim is seizing on the leaflets to manufacture a crisis. He has been dissatisfied with the diplomatic process ever since his failed Hanoi summit with President Donald Trump in February 2019, which collapsed without a hoped-for deal to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange for easing economic sanctions. “I don’t think it’s surprising to see North Korea taking actions that demonstrate its frustration with the current situation,” Aum said in a recent interview. “Pretty much since Hanoi, they haven’t been able to achieve what they want in terms of sanctions relief, in terms of some of the things that they consider aspects of a hostile U.S. policy.” He pointed to Seoul’s recent purchases of American-made military hardware like the RQ-4 Global Hawk reconnaissance drones, which are equipped with powerful radar and surveillance equipment, as an irritant for the North. “The decision to demolish the liaison center is significant in the sense that it was done dramatically, and with finality,” suggesting that “there are more provocations coming.” Moon, who has staked his presidency on a policy of engagement with North Korea, has tried to keep cross-border diplomacy alive through various proposals to increase humanitarian aid and tourism exchanges. On Monday, Seoul proposed sending two senior officials to Pyongyang for talks. The North, which has long made clear that its priority is major sanctions relief, rejected what it called the “tactless and sinister proposal” and instead proceeded to blow up the liaison office. It also announced it would redeploy troops to frontline areas that were demilitarized two years ago, including Kaesong and Mount Kumgang, both of which had previously hosted joint economic projects designed to boost inter-Korean cooperation. The public face of North Korea’s bellicosity is Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong. Much of the harsh rhetoric directed toward Seoul in state media has been attributed to her, leading many analysts to suspect that she is being positioned as a potential stand-in or even a successor to her 36-year-old brother, who is overweight and a heavy smoker, with a history of health problems. He went missing from public view for several weeks recently, only to reemerge last month, leading to swirling rumors that he had suffered a medical emergency. Or it could simply be that Kim Yo Jong is serving as attack dog so that her brother can easily step back into the role of peacemaker should tensions subside in the future. For now, though, **the Kim regime’s hostility seems aimed at trying to stay in the headlines and force more concessions.** Its harsh criticism of Moon, whom Kim Yo Jong has mocked as a flunky of the Americans, may also be an effort to capitalize on tensions between the United States and South Korea due to Trump’s demands that the Moon administration pay billions of dollars more to support U.S. military bases in South Korea. North Korea is “always looking for ways to break up the Washington-Seoul alliance,” David Maxwell and Matthew Ha, of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, wrote recently. “A violent act that will leave some calling for retaliatory action and others looking to find ways to calm Pyongyang down is a great way to do that.” Moon, who took office in 2017, has certainly adopted one of the most accommodationist stances toward the North of any South Korean president in recent memory. But he **is still unlikely to do anything that would potentially undermine relations with the U.S.**, particularly as he enters the final stretch of his single 5-year term. And nuclear talks between Pyongyang and Washington will probably remain stalled at least until November, as Trump campaigns for reelection with cascading domestic crises on his hands. With diplomacy in a holding pattern, then, Pyongyang looks set to continue ratcheting up tensions. **A return to testing nuclear weapons or intercontinental ballistic missiles seems improbable, as that would provoke the ire of North Korean allies like China and Russia,** whose assistance is all the more critical as Pyongyang grapples with the fallout of COVID-19. Instead, a test of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, or more artillery drills and short-range projectile launches, could be in the offing. North Korea also has a long history of bloody provocations against the South. In 2010, during a time of heightened tensions on the peninsula, it sank a South Korean naval ship with a torpedo, killing 46 sailors. That same year, it shelled a South Korean island near a disputed maritime border, killing four people—including two civilians—and injuring at least 18 more. While most analysts see such large-scale attacks as unlikely in the current climate, the North has always been willing to take extraordinary risks to achieve its objectives. Alternatively, it could try a lower-grade attack along the lines of a 2015 incident, in which Seoul accused North Korean soldiers of sneaking over to its side of the border and placing land mines near a South Korean guard post, causing two soldiers to lose their limbs. North Korean state media has also ramped up threats in recent weeks against defectors in the South, threatening to “force the betrayers and human scum to pay the dearest price for their crimes.” Given Pyongyang’s track record of carrying out assassinations on foreign soil—most notably using a powerful nerve agent to kill Kim’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, at a crowded airport terminal in Malaysia in 2017—it could try similar tactics against defectors. South Korean authorities claimed to have intercepted at least one such attempt in 2011 to kill Park Sang-hak, a prominent defector and activist who was involved in the recent propaganda leaflet campaign. Looking ahead, much will depend on how Moon responds to the North’s saber-rattling. The Defense Ministry in Seoul promised the North will “certainly pay the price” should it follow through on threats of military action. But Moon has invested tremendous amounts of political capital into a policy of inter-Korean détente and peacebuilding. He could still try to find ways to reconcile with the North, even as his dreams of a durable peace seem to be collapsing—literally and figuratively—before his eyes.

#### Status quo cooperation maintains balance and strategic stability with North Korea

**Kim 20** – (Duyeon, Senior Adviser, North East Asia & Nuclear Policy for International Crisis Group, supplies research, analysis, and policy recommendations regarding the Korean Peninsula, north-east Asian relations including with the United States, nuclear nonproliferation, and arms control, 7/7, “Korean Tensions: An Unexpected Pause in an Uncertain Time,” [accessed 8/30/20], <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/korean-tensions-unexpected-pause-uncertain-time>, see)

After weeks of ratcheting up tensions on the Korean peninsula, including lodging near-daily threats against South Korea in reaction to some of its citizens sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border, **North Korea has decided to pause.** On 24 June, **North Korean state media reported that Kim Jong-un opted to defer plans to take certain military actions**, after considering an unspecified “prevailing situation” during a virtual preliminary meeting of the Worker’s Party Central Military Commission over which he presided. For now, one can only guess at the reasons for the sudden pause. Did reported U.S. B-52 bomber flyovers near Japan on 24 June, coupled with three U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the region, deter North Korea? Did Seoul or even Beijing make a backdoor deal with Pyongyang to provide aid in exchange for the pause? Did Kim feel that he had vented enough frustration about the leaflets and decide to pace himself until the U.S. presidential election? Or perhaps North Korea never intended to take the calibrated military actions it had threatened in the first place. There is always the risk of miscalculation that could trigger an inadvertent and dangerous escalation. Whatever the case may be, the reasons why North Korea escalated tensions have not dissipated. The regime remains frustrated, though it remains unclear how it will channel these feelings. Pyongyang may simply be waiting to see what Seoul and Washington do before deciding on its next move, keeping tensions simmering on the peninsula – for domestic political purposes and to gain leverage in any future negotiations – until after the U.S. election. Even so, and although Pyongyang’s threats and demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office on its side of the border on 16 June appear to have been undertaken mainly for their shock value, there is always the risk of miscalculation that could trigger an inadvertent and dangerous escalation. Pyongyang might also abruptly engage in confrontational actions during what appears to be a quiet time – something it has done in the past. Beijing, Seoul, Washington and other countries with an interest in stability on the Korean peninsula should be prepared for all these scenarios during this uncertain period. On 17 June, North Korea’s military announced that it was studying plans to deploy soldiers and “firepower sub-units” to the Mount Kumgang tourism area and Kaesong industrial zone, restore guard posts at the demilitarised zone, deploy artillery units and troops to the “front lines” (near or around the border) and conduct exercises there, and provide military assistance for “scattering leaflets against the south”. Kim Jong-un’s influential sister, Kim Yo-jong, also threatened to scrap the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement to cease hostilities on land, air and sea. **A close look at these possible plans reveals that none would pose physical harm to South Korea**. Arguably, Kim might have opted for a pause precisely because he concluded there was little to gain from moving forward with plans that he realised would have minimal impact. After all, the Mount Kumgang tours and Kaesong Industrial Complex have been shut down since 2008 and 2016, respectively. Remilitarising the demilitarised zone and sending military forces to the “front lines” would expose North Korean troop positions. **Scattering fliers across South Korea would do no damage to people or property.** Pyongyang’s threatened leaflet war was expected to kick off around the 70th anniversary of the Korean War on 25 June. It was interrupted, however, by Korea’s rainy season and winds blowing from south to north that are common during the summer. (Early summer tends to be when South Korean activists and North Korean defectors float anti-Kim messages northward in balloons that also contain information about the outside world and democracy, while North Koreans typically send their propaganda fliers in the winter when wind currents blow south.) Pictures of the North Korean materials released by state media show a defaced image of South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Scribbling on the face of its leader was aiming for South Korea’s jugular in the eyes of the North, where doing the same to Chairman Kim would be viewed as an unforgivable insult. North Korea’s declaration of a “leaflet war” against South Korea may seem silly to the outside world. But to Pyongyang, the information South Korean fliers convey, and the way in which they counter regime propaganda directed at the North’s people, are most threatening. In her 17 June statement, Kim’s sister said the South Korean bulletins “dared defame the dignity of our supreme leadership, our Chairman whom we hold most sacred as the central core, and mocked at all our people at the same time”. Against this backdrop, the announcement of preparations to bombard South Korea with millions of paper fliers may have been intended primarily to boost morale at home and to shore up internal unity. While not necessarily a cause for concern in the South, the move likely would have been well received by North Korean elites who are Kim’s key constituents. To retain power, Kim needs to be attentive to domestic political objectives including maintaining regime legitimacy, diverting attention from the country’s domestic policy failures and satisfying his constituents. North Korea’s justification for ramping up tensions was what it sees as broken promises and hostile acts by South Korea. According to North Korean media, Pyongyang rejected Seoul’s 15 June offer to send a special envoy to smooth over tensions, demanding actions rather than words. **But behind the rage appears to be a North Korean leadership desperate to find solutions for the country’s economic difficulties.** Pyongyang’s proximate reason for threatening South Korea was the leaflets, which it saw as violating a prior commitment. The two Korean leaders had agreed in their 2018 Panmunjom Declaration to cease “as of May 1 this year … all hostile acts and eliminating their means, including broadcasting through loudspeakers and distribution of leaflets, in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line”. The Moon government ended loudspeaker broadcasts, but for two years has been unable to stop South Koreans from sending fliers. When Kim Yo-jong publicly demanded a legal ban on leaflets, the Moon government and ruling-party lawmakers vowed to prosecute and take legal action against activist groups. This response was met with harsh domestic and international criticism that such actions would violate South Koreans’ constitutional rights and democratic freedoms. Pyongyang evidently judged Seoul’s promises insufficient, proceeding to demolish the inter-Korean liaison office. Destroying the liaison office was a symbolic and calculated move. The office was of no unique value to Kim – cross-border communications are possible without it – but it was the prized symbol of Moon’s engagement policy and cost South Korean taxpayers about 9.7 billion won ($8.6 million). It was not functioning properly due to strained relations, was vacant because of the pandemic, and was located in North Korean territory. Pyongyang knew the explosion would not invite retaliation as it was not an attack on South Korea. **At the core of recent threats and building destruction is the regime’s apparent frustration over its domestic difficulties.** Beyond the leaflets, at the core of recent threats and building destruction is the regime’s apparent frustration over its domestic difficulties. The North’s economic stagnation, which started with post-2016 international sanctions intended to pressure it to return to diplomatic negotiations and to dry up funding for its nuclear weapons program, was unexpectedly compounded by the pandemic. The pandemic has halted nearly all trade with China, which had been Pyongyang’s most trusted lifeline, enabling the regime until now to defy collapse in the face of famines, natural disasters, sanctions and other challenges. The best way for the regime to divert attention from Kim’s performance at home is to deflect his constituents’ gaze outward. Placing blame on the virus itself could be harder: it would not fit the regime’s self-legitimising narrative, which holds sanctions responsible for the country’s economic woes, or match Pyongyang’s official position that COVID-19 has not infected any North Koreans. Moreover, Pyongyang may want to avoid possibly annoying Beijing, which might see blaming the virus as a way of subtly pointing to the trade slowdown with China as the source of North Korea’s economic difficulties. Instead, **it is easier to take the traditional route of placing the onus on sanctions, and easier still to target South Korea than to take on the U.S., which holds the cards regarding North Korea’s future.** At the same time, North Korean statements for over a year, taken together, suggest that Pyongyang feels betrayed by Seoul’s confident assertions that it could persuade Washington to relax some sanctions and allow the beginning of cross-border economic projects. The September 2018 Pyongyang Joint Declaration between the two Korean leaders stipulates that **Pyongyang was willing to dismantle nuclear facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear complex** “as the United States takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement” that resulted from the historic Singapore summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump. But five months later, Kim discovered at the follow-up summit in Hanoi that the Trump administration was not willing to trade the sanctions relief he was seeking for Yongbyon. Against this backdrop, Kim is now increasing pressure on the South, implying (however fancifully) that Seoul could persuade Washington to lift sanctions by placing a higher priority on the pursuit of pan-Korean nationalism – something Moon has promised to do – even at the expense of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. North Korea might be taking a breather at the moment, but Moon is still faced with one of the most serious predicaments of his single-term presidency. His dream of inter-Korean rapprochement and peace is in crisis. Moon will try to please both Pyongyang and Washington unless one side or the other gives him no option but to choose. Maintaining this balance will not be politically easy, as Moon’s nationalist supporters want him to privilege inter-Korean ties over all else, especially because they blame Washington for soured Korean relations. It will bolster their case if Trump continues to pressure Seoul to pay more for hosting U.S. troops or makes a flippant remark that makes the quiet undercurrent of anti-American sentiment in South Korea erupt. On 24 June, Pyongyang stressed that it had merely suspended its military plans, and not cancelled them, warning that it could always “reconsider” the postponement. While the tone of the statement in Korean was subdued, it nevertheless raises the question of whether the world will witness a North Korean “October surprise” that would destabilise the peninsula in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election. While that possibility cannot be excluded, North Korea’s interests might point it in a different direction. Pyongyang likely would prefer Trump’s re-election because the president has shown such personal interest in making a deal with Kim. This preference would presumably lead it to refrain from actions that would not only risk a harsh response from Washington but could also highlight that Trump’s negotiations with Kim have met with little success (notwithstanding his earlier boasts to the contrary) and confront him with a foreign policy crisis in advance of the November polls. Pyongyang will also likely be prudent enough to avoid any act that could result in South Korean injuries or casualties, since Seoul would almost certainly retaliate in kind. That said, there is always a risk of miscalculation. Still, Pyongyang might take other provocative measures – including testing weapons, firing artillery or other shows of force. Steps like these are not always aimed at grabbing Washington’s attention. Often, Pyongyang is driven by domestic political objectives, military imperatives relating to perfection of its weaponry, or the desire to commemorate milestones such as the 75th anniversary of its Workers’ Party in October. Pyongyang might also take such actions to send a message – for example, to protest U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, including those scheduled for August, which Moon also promised to end in his 2018 agreement with Kim. In virtually all these cases, an overarching goal is to create divisions between the U.S. and its regional allies and maintain tensions on the Korean peninsula for leverage in any future negotiations, which seem unlikely to resume until after the U.S. election. Washington and Seoul will need to engage in a delicate dance that avoids providing any pretext for North Korea to act out militarily, while sustaining readiness and deterrence. Until then, Washington and Seoul will need to engage in a delicate dance that avoids providing any pretext for North Korea to act out militarily, while sustaining readiness and deterrence on the Korean peninsula and seeking opportunities to advance nuclear negotiations. In this spirit, the Trump administration should continue to express interest in diplomacy even as it and other governments continue to enforce UN sanctions. Countries with influence over North Korea and an interest in peninsular stability, starting with China, should continue to call on Pyongyang to refrain from escalation and instead engage in dialogue. Furthermore, if Pyongyang nevertheless takes potentially destabilising steps, Washington and Seoul should have a game plan for responding in a measured way; in particular, they should signal that they will beef up joint military drills if Pyongyang escalates. Through these measures, the parties can serve their mutual interest in promoting peninsular and regional stability while managing the security situation during an uncertain time.

#### North Korea won’t first strike

**Bennett and Kim 20** – (Bruce W. and Soo, Bruce Bennett is a senior defense analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. Soo Kim is a policy analyst at RAND, 6/29, “Is North Korea Really Prepared to End the Korean War?” [accessed 8/30/20], <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/north-korea-really-prepared-end-korean-war-163719>, see)

The end of the Korean War and peace on the peninsula are no more likely to occur as the result of a peace agreement than has North Korean denuclearization occurred as the result of multiple denuclearization agreements. Ultimately, North Korean objectives matter, and real peace does not appear to be part of those objectives. The North Korean regime has been very clear that its two primary objectives are regime survival and Korean unification controlled by the North. The North Korean regime has reason to be worried about its survival, given its many failures in the last several years, to include the difficulties it is apparently facing in just feeding the people of Pyongyang now. The regime seems to perceive that it can overcome its third world, impoverished conditions if it can impose unification on the South, perhaps the only justification for the regime’s building dozens of nuclear weapons. But first, the North must help decouple the ROK/U.S. alliance. Without U.S. extended deterrence, the South could be vulnerable to North Korean nuclear coercion and attacks. While we seldom consider the Korean War ending with the North’s original objective of victory, Kim Jong-un appears to be hoping to achieve that outcome. His insistence on the importance of unification has been a recurring theme in his New Year’s addresses. Despite Kim’s dream of controlling the peninsula, a unification imposed by North Korean nuclear coercion or attack would be unlikely to really end the Korean War. Seeking dominance rather than unification, a North Korea in charge of all of Korea would probably use its hallmark brutality in purging ROK business, political, and military leaders, replacing them with North Koreans loyal to the Kim Family but so lacking in the knowledge and experience required to run South Korean business that they could instead destroy those businesses. **The North’s use of nuclear weapons would also probably lead to the imposition of substantial international trade sanctions,** which when combined with North Korean mismanagement could gradually strangle even the ROK economy which is heavily export-oriented—a real trade war. The wealth of the South would not last long in such extreme circumstances, leaving the South Korean people impoverished as the North might expropriate their residual wealth. This is not a picture of peace. To end the Korean War, the North could abandon its designs for dominating the South. Doing so would allow the North to abandon its quest for a major nuclear weapon force, instead of investing in the welfare of the North Korean people. After all, North Korea has not needed nuclear weapons to defend itself against U.S. attacks since 1953. The North’s saying so is simply an excuse for building an offensive nuclear weapon force when no defensive force is needed. Both sides could then turn to eliminating the hostility that each feels. But North Korea appears far more hostile toward the United States than vice-versa. After all, no U.S. indoctrination tells its people that the North Koreans are the eternal enemies of the United States, but North Koreans are trained that Americans are their eternal enemies from a very young age. Can there be true peace on the Korean peninsula if such behavior continues? Many of the sanctions against North Korea are condition-based. If the North constrains and eventually reduces its nuclear weapon program, those sanctions will be relaxed. And without nuclear weapon threats and those sanctions, both sides could build toward ending the Korean War. But North Korea has to decide that it seeks peaceful coexistence and not peninsula dominance. Is it ready to do so?

### A2: Pandemics Add-On

#### Disease won’t cause extinction—we’ll adapt:

Amesh Adalja, 6/17/2016 (infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh, “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?” [https://www.theatlantic.com/health/ archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/](https://www.theatlantic.com/health/%20archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/), Retrieved 6/12/2021)

In other words, no, I wasn’t worried—and not because I have a rosy outlook on infectious diseases. I’m well-aware of the damage these diseases are causing around the world: HIV, malaria, tuberculosis; the influenza pandemic that took the world by surprise in 2009; the anti-vaccine movement bumping cases of measles to an all-time post-vaccine-era high; antibiotic-resistant bacteria threatening to collapse the entire structure of modern medicine—all these, like Ebola, are continuously placing an enormous number of lives at risk. But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained. I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience. For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived. Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like. So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now? In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians. The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies. HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk. Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care. Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions. While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary. None of this is meant to allay all fears of infectious diseases. To totally adopt a Panglossian viewpoint would be foolish—and dangerous. Humans do face countless threats from infectious diseases: witness Zika. And if not handled appropriately, severe calamity could, and will, ensue. The West African Ebola outbreak, for instance, festered for months before major efforts to bring it under control were initiated. When it comes to infectious diseases, I’m worried about the failure of institutions to understand the full impact of outbreaks. I’m worried about countries that don’t have the infrastructure or resources to combat these outbreaks when they come. But as long as we can keep adapting, I’m not worried about the future of the human race.

#### Disease risk to humans is tiny—the disads outweigh:

KATHERINE J. WU, 4/15/2020 (Ph.D. in microbiology and immunobiology from Harvard, “There are more viruses than stars in the universe. Why do only some infect us?” <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/factors-allow-viruses-infect-humans-coronavirus>, Retrieved 6/12/2021)

An estimated 10 nonillion (10 to the 31st power) individual viruses exist on our planet—enough to assign one to every star in the universe 100 million times over. Viruses infiltrate every aspect of our natural world, seething in seawater, drifting through the atmosphere, and lurking in miniscule motes of soil. Generally considered non-living entities, these pathogens can only replicate with the help of a host, and they are capable of hijacking organisms from every branch of the tree of life—including a multitude of human cells. Yet, most of the time, our species manages to live in this virus-filled world relatively free of illness. The reason has less to do with the human body’s resilience to disease than the biological quirks of viruses themselves, says Sara Sawyer, a virologist and disease ecologist at the University of Colorado Boulder. These pathogens are extraordinarily picky about the cells they infect, and only an infinitesimally small fraction of the viruses that surround us actually pose any threat to humans. Still, as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic clearly demonstrates, outbreaks of new human viruses do happen—and they aren’t as unexpected as they might seem. To better forecast and prevent outbreaks, scientists are homing in on the traits that may explain why some viruses, and not others, can make the hop into humans. Some mutate more frequently, perhaps easing their spread into new hosts, while others are helped along by human encounters with animals that provide opportunities to jump species. When it comes to epidemics, “there are actually patterns there,” says Raina Plowright, a disease ecologist at Montana State University. “And they are predictable patterns.” Crossing the species divide Most new infectious illnesses enter the human population the same way COVID-19 did: as a zoonosis, or a disease that infects people by way of an animal. Mammals and birds alone are thought to host about 1.7 million undiscovered types of viruses—a number that has spurred scientists around the world to survey Earth’s wildlife for the cause of our species’ next pandemic. (Bacteria, fungi, and parasites can also pass from animals to people, but these pathogens can typically reproduce without infecting hosts, and many viruses are better equipped to cross species.) To make a successful transition from one species to another, a virus must clear a series of biological hurdles. The pathogen has to exit one animal and come into contact with another, then establish an infection in the second host, says Jemma Geoghegan, a virologist at Macquarie University. This is known as a spillover event. After the virus has set up shop in a new host, it then needs to spread to other members of that species. Exact numbers are hard to estimate, but the vast majority of animal-to-human spillovers likely result in dead-end infections that never progress past the first individual. For a new virus to actually spark an outbreak, “so many factors need to align,” says Dorothy Tovar, a virologist and disease ecologist at Stanford University. researchers taking blood samples from a chicken to test for avian flu Inspectors take a blood sample from a chicken to test for avian flu in Can Tho, Vietnam. PHOTOGRAPH BY LYNN JOHNSON, NAT GEO IMAGE COLLECTION Those factors include how often a virus-carrying animal encounters humans, the means through which a virus is spread, how long a virus can persist outside of a host, and how efficiently a virus can subvert the human immune system. A wrinkle at any step along the chain of transmission could foil the pathogen’s attempt to infect a new species. Even factors that seem innocuous—like above-average rainfall, or a local food shortage—can rejigger the dynamics of how humans and animals interact. For a virus, one of most challenging aspects of transmission is gaining entry to a new host’s cells, which contain the molecular machinery that these pathogens need to replicate. This process typically involves a virus latching on to a molecule that studs the outside of a human cell—a bit like a key clicking into a lock. The better the fit, the more likely the pathogen is to access the cell’s interior. SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus that causes COVID-19, engages with the protein ACE2 to enter cells in the human airway. For any given host, “there’s a very small number of pathogens that are able to” break into its cells this way, Sawyer says. The vast majority of the viruses we encounter simply bounce off our cells, eventually exiting our bodies as harmless visitors. The many faces of viruses Sometimes, however, a pathogen manages to slip through. More than 200 viruses are known to cause disease in humans, and all are capable of breaking into human cells. But they almost certainly didn’t start out with that ability. The host molecules that viruses glom on to, which are called receptors, tend to be highly variable from one species to the next, Sawyer says. “A key property of a virus that can accomplish a zoonosis is that it can, with a small number of evolutionary steps, adapt to use the human version of that receptor.” Viruses with a lot of genetic flexibility, and particularly those that encode their genomes as RNA rather than DNA, are well-suited to crossing the species divide. Compared to viruses and cells that rely on DNA, RNA viruses tend to be sloppy when copying over their genetic code, introducing mutations at a high rate. This error-prone process creates an immense amount of diversity into populations of RNA viruses, allowing them to adapt to new environments—including new host species—at a rapid pace, says Sarah Zohdy, a disease ecologist at Auburn University. Of the pathogens that have infected the human population in recent decades, the majority have been RNA viruses, including Ebola, SARS, MERS, Zika, several influenza viruses, and SARS-CoV-2. Some viruses can also change up their genetic code through a second method that’s a bit like sexual reproduction. When two genetically dissimilar viruses infect the same cell, they may swap segments of their genomes with each other as they replicate, yielding hybrid viruses that differ from both their “parents.” Flu viruses, which rely on RNA, are among those that both mutate independently and frequently mingle their genomes—traits that have helped influenza shuttle back and forth between an entire menagerie of wild and domestic species, including pigs, whales, horses, seals, several types of birds, and, of course, humans. The “perfect” pathogen Neither mutation nor viral interbreeding, however, can guarantee spillover—and viruses that lack one or both traits can still infect a wide range of hosts. A few years ago, Geoghegan and her colleagues identified a slew of other characteristics common to viruses that cause disease in humans. Their analysis revealed that viruses seemed to benefit from hiding in their hosts for long periods of time without being lethal. Lengthier infections, she says, likely give these stealthy pathogens more time to adapt and spread to new species. Many of the pathogens that jump into people do so from rodents, bats, and non-human primates, likely due to some combination of these species’ abundance, proximity to people, and biological similarities to humans, Zohdy says. And of course, viruses related to known human pathogens, such as new strains of influenza and the novel coronavirus, are always possible threats. Although many of these microbes end up being harmless to humans, a handful of genetic changes can make them compatible with our cells. Viral traits alone aren’t enough to predict pandemics. But as scientists continue to catalog the diverse viruses that inhabit our planet, knowing some of these telltale traits can help them prioritize pathogens for further study, says Tracey Goldstein, associate director of the University of California, Davis’ One Health Institute. After a candidate virus is identified in the field, it can be brought into the lab to see if it’s actually capable of infecting and replicating in human cells. Traditionally, many of these steps have been performed by different groups of researchers, with some focusing their efforts on sampling viruses in the wild, and others sticking mostly to characterizing pathogens in the lab, Tovar says. However, scientists can’t get a full picture of the pathogens that could put us at risk without surveillance in the field, and they can’t confirm which ones pose the biggest threats without laboratory experiments. “So many things need to come together, and it all matters,” Plowright says. But this complexity can work in humans’ favor: The more spillover factors that researchers identify, the more opportunities they have to intervene. Eventually, with enough information, we might even be able to stop outbreaks before they occur. “The amount of information we’ve been able to get in such a short period of time … is incredible,” Zohdy says. “That’s already giving me hope.”

# Disadvantages

## Rogue AI Disadvantage

### Rogue AI DA – 1N

#### Current cooperation with NATO on AI is modest in scope.

Simona R. Soare, 2021 (Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis), ALGORITHMIC POWER, NATO AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Nov. 19, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/11/algorithmic-power-nato-and-artificial-intelligence>

Another question that remains to be answered is the extent of NATO’s ambition to adopt AI. The strategy is meant to be implemented in a phased approach, partly to build political support for AI military projects. Initial ambitions seem modest, reportedly focusing on mission planning and support; smart maintenance and logistics for NATO capabilities; data fusion and analysis; cyber defence; and optimisation of back-office processes. As political acceptance grows and following periodic reviews of the strategy’s implementation, the goal is to also include more complex operational applications.

#### International cooperation with NATO allows technological revolutions in AI.

Ananya Avasthi, 10/29/2021 (Founder and Director - Anuvaad Solutions), NATO’s PLAN FOR AI. Oct. 29, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://datasaur.ai/blog-posts/natos-plan-for-ai>

AI is currently on its way to transforming NATO operations by changing the international security environment. AI has infinite uses so, AI has a lot of international security challenges, which affect traditional military capabilities, which can provide new opportunities in response to them. AI will transfigure all of NATO’s core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. This dynamic brings new opportunities, risks, and threats to prosperity and security at stake. The pros and cons connected to this foundational technology are too vast for any single entity to determine alone. In that respect, cooperation is required to properly tackle international security risks. It is also necessary to capitalize on the technology’s potential to revolutionize enterprise functions, mission support, and operations.

#### Advancing AI is the most likely existential risk to humanity.

Kai Kupferschmidt, 2018 (contributing correspondent for Science magazine), SCIENCE. Jan. 11, 2018. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.science.org/content/article/could-science-destroy-world-these-scholars-want-save-us-modern-day-frankenstein>

Viruses are unlikely to kill every last human, Bostrom says; for him and others, it is AI that poses truly existential threats. Most scenarios center on machines out-smarting humans, a feat called "super-intelligence." If such AI were ever achieved and it acquired a will of its own, it might turn malevolent and actively seek to destroy humans, like HAL, the computer that goes rogue aboard a spaceship in Stanley Kubrick's film 2001: A Space Odyssey. Most AI experts worry less about machines rising up to overthrow their creators, however, than about them making a fatal mistake. To Tallinn, the most plausible way in which AI could end humanity is if it simply pursued its goals and, along the way, heedlessly created an environment fatal to humans. "Imagine a situation where the temperature rises by 100° or is lowered by 100°. We'd go extinct in a matter of minutes," Tallinn says. Tegmark agrees: "The real problem with AI is not malice, it's incompetence," he says.

#### D. We should slow down our race to develop AI because we cannot control it.

Robby Berman, 2021 (political analyst), THE FUTURE. Jan. 20, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://bigthink.com/the-future/superintelligent-ai-planck/>

The Planck researchers also concluded that a similar bit of logic makes it impossible for us to know when a self-learning computer’s intelligence has come to exceed our own. Essentially, we’re not smart enough to be able to develop tests for intelligence superior to ours. This means that it’s entirely conceivable that an AI capable of self-learning may well quietly ascend to super-intelligence without our even knowing it — a scary reason all by itself to slow down our hurly-burley race to artificial intelligence.

### UQ – Cooperation is Narrow

#### Current NATO-US cooperation on AI will lead to narrow implementation.

Simona R. Soare, 2021 (Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis), ALGORITHMIC POWER, NATO AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Nov. 19, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/11/algorithmic-power-nato-and-artificial-intelligence>

Finally, the AI strategy runs parallel to NATO’s Military Strategy, a military-led process launched in 2019, and its Warfighting Capstone Concept, which examines alliance requirements in future operating environments. However, the AI strategy is a stand-alone document. To avoid creating narrow implementation tracks, meaningful early engagement between NATO’s policy and military communities would be beneficial to cut across any disconnect between threat-based assessments of the impact of AI on military capabilities and politically driven processes for the development and use of AI.

#### Close cooperation between Europe and the US on AI is not occurring now.

Ulrike Franke, 2021 (Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations), ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI. Jan. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/

Close cooperation between Europe and the US is not a given: Europe sees the US as its main competitor in AI; the US wants to join forces against China on AI, but European interest in such a front is weak. The non-combat military realm may be a good area for transatlantic AI cooperation.

### Link – Cooperation Grows AI

#### The development of robust AI requires cooperation between the US & democratic allies.

Joshua P. Meltzer et al, 2021 (senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution), STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Feb. 17, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-international-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/>

To foster AI policies that support development of beneficial, trustworthy, and robust artificial intelligence will require international engagement by the United States and cooperation among like-minded democracies that are leaders in artificial intelligence. This paper looks at the challenges of international cooperation to these ends. First, it provides background on AI and key government policies in the U.S. and among its major trading partners. It then examines drivers of international cooperation in AI, current mechanisms of cooperation, and their limits. Finally, it makes recommendations for how the Biden-Harris administration should respond to these challenges and work with like-minded countries.

#### International coordination is necessary for AI policies to realize their full potential.

Joshua P. Meltzer et al, 2021 (senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution), STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Feb. 17, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-international-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/>

The second challenge comes from other governments whose AI policies could lead to prescriptive regulation that may stifle AI innovation and discriminate against U.S. technology firms. Such policies also disregard the global nature of AI development. Without international coordination and integration, AI policies are unlikely to realize their potential and instead create barriers to AI diffusion globally.

#### International cooperation on AI promotes adoption of AI technology around the globe.

Joshua P. Meltzer et al, 2021 (senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution), STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Feb. 17, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-international-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/>

U.S. AI policy also recognizes the importance of international cooperation on AI: The American AI Initiative recognizes partnerships with U.S. allies and partners represent a key “source of strategic competitive advantage,” and identifies the need to “engage internationally to promote a global environment that supports American AI research and innovation and opens markets for American AI industries.”[22] The identified goals of engagement include supporting the uptake of trustworthy AI innovation and promoting trust in and adoption of AI technologies for economic growth and global security.

#### Collaborative AI research bolsters AI innovation.

Joshua P. Meltzer et al, 2021 (senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution), STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Feb. 17, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-international-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/>

As an advanced product of digital technologies and the internet, AI has grown up across national boundaries. Much research and development is collaborative but, because of its scale and complexity, AI R&D is particularly so. It often involves multidisciplinary teams in multiple locations. It relies heavily on open source software, global publications, shared data, and distributed computing. This open and distributed approach to AI innovation has allowed researchers from China to Australia to India to gain AI skills and contribute to global AI innovation.[38] Successful development and deployment of AI require government policies that can sustain these ecosystems of collaboration. The inclusion of international cooperation as an element of such policies indicates a number of governments appreciate the connection between AI development and collaboration across borders. It also requires a more strategic approach to how Chinese researchers engage, one that avoids shutting the door entirely to collaboration but is clear-eyed about the risks and takes appropriate measures to mitigate these.

#### International cooperation on AI ensures global adoption of AI technology.

Joshua P. Meltzer et al, 2021 (senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution), STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Feb. 17, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-international-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/>

International cooperation on AI is also required to ensure that the capacity to develop and use AI is distributed globally and not confined to some developed countries. The number of countries reported in the OECD AI observatory shows the broad interest in harnessing the benefits of AI everywhere. Realizing this interest will require building global capacity for AI development and its application and advocating for policies that support innovation and R&D, including access to data, talent, and computing capacity. Indeed, how the rest of the world develops and uses AI presents the U.S. a key opportunity for global leadership on AI development and norms and in support of broader development needs.

#### International cooperation is necessary for the global potential of AI.

Joshua P. Meltzer et al, 2021 (senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution), STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Feb. 17, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-international-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/>

A common approach to AI ethics alone is unlikely to provide sufficient glue for robust cooperation on AI. Just as unilateral regulation in the name of ethics can erect barriers to trade, other AI policies can have the same effect. Some government efforts to capture the economic benefits from AI is driving mercantilist policies aimed at boosting domestic AI development in the name of digital sovereignty.[42] Such policies may have negative spillovers, such as restrictions on access to data, data localization, discriminatory investment, or disproportionate compliance requirements that can hamper economic growth and gains from AI.[43] International cooperation is needed here to address the risks of protectionism and avoid trade tensions that limit the global potential of AI.

### Link – Cooperation with Europe Grows AI

#### Cooperation with NATO speeds up the process for AI adoption.

Ananya Avasthi, 2021 (Founder and Director - Anuvaad Solutions), NATO’s PLAN FOR AI. Oct. 29, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://datasaur.ai/blog-posts/natos-plan-for-ai>

Since the adoption of the NATO AI Strategy, Allies are working towards cooperation and collaboration to meet these requirements in terms of both defense and security, NATO as the primary transatlantic forum. The goal of NATO’s AI Strategy is to speed up the process for AI adoption by amplifying key AI enablers and adapting policy, this includes adopting Principles of Responsible Use for AI. All these precautions are taken in order to avoid the malicious use of AI by state and non-state actors.

#### NATO cooperation will allow the alliance to exploit AI developments.

Simona R. Soare, 2021 (Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis), ALGORITHMIC POWER, NATO AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Nov. 19, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/11/algorithmic-power-nato-and-artificial-intelligence>

The Alliance aims to exploit AI developments in the commercial sector by adopting an open innovation model and deliberately moving away from its present procurement model. However, this will require an effort to map out the relationship between old structures, such as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group, and new engagement channels with the private sector, such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and others created by the AI strategy.

#### Cooperation with Europe ensures US leadership on global AI.

Joshua P. Meltzer et al, 2021 (senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution), STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Feb. 17, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-international-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/>

The U.S. should lead an international effort to address pressing global challenges using AI. This would go beyond overarching issues like ethics and governance that have been the focus of discussion in existing international forums, and put cooperation on AI into practice. This should seek to address transnational issues that demand public intervention at scale, such as health (e.g., disease migration) and climate change (e.g., climate modeling). Such leadership could begin in cooperation with the EU and other government) but should become part of broader U.S. diplomatic and development outreach and investment.

#### Cooperation with Europe bolsters AI development.

Joshua P. Meltzer et al, 2021 (senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution), STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Feb. 17, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-international-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/>

The EU is pivotal to successful international cooperation. Together, the U.S. and EU comprise the largest trade relationship in the world, important markets, and key sources of AI capacity including AI talent, capital, and other resources. As the EU embarks on an ambitious agenda of legislation on AI and other technology issues, the two unions need to move rapidly to avoid a repeat of the divergence that has made privacy and data protection a point of ongoing friction. The EU is also an essential partner in dealing with China and other aspects of international cooperation.

### Impact – Existential Risk

#### AI is our biggest existential threat.

Mark Stockley, 2015 (writer for Sophos), ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COULD MAKE US EXTINCT, WARN OXFORD UNIVERSITY RESEARCHERS. Feb. 17, 2015. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/02/17/artificial-intelligence-could-make-us-extinct-warn-oxford-university-researchers/>

Oxford University isn’t the first to draw attention to the potential threat posed by super-intelligent computers. Elon Musk, the man behind PayPal, Tesla Motors and SpaceX, has warned about the dangers of AI repeatedly. Musk has described it as ‘our biggest existential threat‘ and taken on investments in AI companies just so that he can keep a close eye on what’s going on. Speaking to students at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) he likened it to a demon that, once summoned, won’t be controllable: With artificial intelligence we are summoning the demon. In all those stories where there’s the guy with the pentagram and the holy water, it’s like - yeah, he’s sure he can control the demon. Doesn’t work out

#### Using AI to attempt to solve problems like climate change could lead to human extinction.

Gerrard Kaonga, 2019 (US News Reporter), EXPRESS. Oct. 7, 2019. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.express.co.uk/news/science/1187362/Artificial-Intelligence-robot-news-AI-today-BBC-Stuart-Russell-latest-update-robots>

Mr Russell insisted that unless this changed, AI could lead to human extinction as we give it the tasks of solving complicated problems like crime and climate change. He said: “If you think about it, the way we build Artificial Intelligence is a bit like the way we think of a genie in a lamp. “You rub the lamp and the genie comes out and you say I want this to happen. “If the AI system is sufficiently powerful it will do exactly what you ask and you will get exactly what you asked for. “Now the problem with genies in lamps is the third wish is always to undo the first two wishes. “This is because we are unable to specify the objectives correctly. “So a machine pursuing an objective that isn’t the right one becomes an enemy of the human race, an enemy that is much more powerful than us.

#### Development of AI could lead to the extinction of the human race.

Mark Stockley, 2015 (writer for Sophos), ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COULD MAKE US EXTINCT, WARN OXFORD UNIVERSITY RESEARCHERS. Feb. 17, 2015. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/02/17/artificial-intelligence-could-make-us-extinct-warn-oxford-university-researchers/>

Stephen Hawking, whose speech synthesiser uses a basic form of AI, isn’t a man with a lot of words to spare and when he spoke to the BBC about AI he was characteristically terse: The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race. Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, couldn't compete, and would be superseded.

#### Artificial Intelligence can grow into a threat capable of causing extinction of humans.

Kai Kupferschmidt, 2018 (contributing correspondent for Science magazine), SCIENCE. Jan. 11, 2018. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.science.org/content/article/could-science-destroy-world-these-scholars-want-save-us-modern-day-frankenstein>

Philosopher Nick Bostrom believes it's entirely possible that artificial intelligence (AI) could lead to the extinction of Homo sapiens. In his 2014 bestseller Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Bostrom paints a dark scenario in which researchers create a machine capable of steadily improving itself. At some point, it learns to make money from online transactions and begins purchasing goods and services in the real world. Using mail-ordered DNA, it builds simple nanosystems that in turn create more complex systems, giving it ever more power to shape the world. Now suppose the AI suspects that humans might interfere with its plans, writes Bostrom, who's at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom. It could decide to build tiny weapons and distribute them around the world covertly. "At a pre-set time, nanofactories producing nerve gas or target-seeking mosquito-like robots might then burgeon forth simultaneously from every square meter of the globe." For Bostrom and a number of other scientists and philosophers, such scenarios are more than science fiction. They're studying which technological advances pose "existential risks" that could wipe out humanity or at least end civilization as we know it—and what could be done to stop them. "Think of what we're trying to do as providing a scientific red team for the things that could threaten our species," says philosopher Huw Price, who heads the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) here at the University of Cambridge.

#### Advanced technology creates the greatest existential risk to humans.

Ross Andersen, 2012 (deputy editor of the Atlantic), WE'RE UNDERESTIMATING THE RISK OF HUMAN EXTINCTION. Mar. 6, 2012. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>

Unthinkable as it may be, humanity, every last person, could someday be wiped from the face of the Earth. We have learned to worry about asteroids and supervolcanoes, but the more-likely scenario, according to Nick Bostrom, a professor of philosophy at Oxford, is that we humans will destroy ourselves. Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.

#### Continued development of AI leads to human extinction.

Michael Cohen, 2021 (MA in computer science from Australian National University), EXTINCTION RISK FROM ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Oct. 12, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://aisafety.wordpress.com/>

Humans will eventually make a human-level intelligence that pursues goals. That intelligence will quickly surpass human-level intelligence. At that point, it will be very hard to keep it from connecting to the Internet. Most goals, when pursued efficiently by an AI connected to the Internet, result in the extinction of biological life. But wait, it gets better! Most goals that preserve human existence still would not preserve freedom, autonomy, and a number of other things we value. Er worse… did I say better? It is profoundly difficult to give an AI a goal such that it would preserve the things we care about, we can’t even check if a potential goal would be safe, and we have to get AI right on the first attempt. If someone makes human-level-AI before anyone makes human-level-AI-with-a-safe-goal-structure, we will all die, and as hard as the former is, the latter is much harder.

#### Technological risks create our biggest existential risks.

Nick Bostrom, 2012 (philosopher @ the University of Oxford), WE'RE UNDERESTIMATING THE RISK OF HUMAN EXTINCTION. Mar. 6, 2012. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>

Bostrom: I think the biggest existential risks relate to certain future technological capabilities that we might develop, perhaps later this century. For example, machine intelligence or advanced molecular nanotechnology could lead to the development of certain kinds of weapons systems. You could also have risks associated with certain advancements in synthetic biology.

#### Artificial Intelligence is our biggest existential threat.

Rory Cellan-Jones, 2014 (Technology correspondent), BBC. Dec. 2, 2014. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540>

Elon Musk, chief executive of rocket-maker Space X, also fears artificial intelligence In the longer term, the technology entrepreneur Elon Musk has warned that AI is "our biggest existential threat". Robotic voice In his BBC interview, Prof Hawking also talks of the benefits and dangers of the internet. He quotes the director of GCHQ's warning about the net becoming the command centre for terrorists: "More must be done by the internet companies to counter the threat, but the difficulty is to do this without sacrificing freedom and privacy."

#### Super-intelligent AI is an existential risk to humans.

Manuel Alfonseca, et al, 2021 (Escuela Politécnica Superior, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain), JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/12202/26642>

An even greater risk, however, is the prospect of a superintelligent AI: an entity that is “smarter than the best human brains in practically every field” (Bostrom, 2014), quoting the words of Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom. A number of public statements by high-profile scientists and technolo¬gists, such as Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk, have given the issue a high prominence (Cellan-Jones, 2014; Proudfoot, 2015). But this concern has also gained relevance in academia, where the discourse about the existential risk related to AI has attracted mathematicians, scientists and philosophers, and funneled funding to research institutes and organizations.

#### Development of full artificial intelligence leads to human extinction.

Rory Cellan-Jones, 2014 (Technology correspondent), BBC. Dec. 2, 2014. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540>

Prof Stephen Hawking, one of Britain's pre-eminent scientists, has said that efforts to create thinking machines pose a threat to our very existence. He told the BBC:"The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race." His warning came in response to a question about a revamp of the technology he uses to communicate, which involves a basic form of AI.

#### Continuing to create AI could pose a threat to human life.

Rory Cellan-Jones, 2014 (Technology correspondent), BBC. Dec. 2, 2014. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540>

Prof Hawking says the primitive forms of artificial intelligence developed so far have already proved very useful, but he fears the consequences of creating something that can match or surpass humans. Stanley Kubrick's film 2001 and its murderous computer HAL encapsulate many people's fears of how AI could pose a threat to human life "It would take off on its own, and re-design itself at an ever increasing rate," he said.

### Impact – Outweighs Other Existential Risks

#### AI is more dangerous than viruses or nuclear war.

Mike Thomas, 2021 (staff reporter), BUILTIN. July 6, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/risks-of-artificial-intelligence>

Considering the number and scope of unfathomably horrible events in world history, that’s really saying something. And in case we haven’t driven home the point quite firmly enough, research fellow Stuart Armstrong from the Future of Life Institute has spoken of AI as an “extinction risk” were it to go rogue. Even nuclear war, he said, is on a different level destruction-wise because it would “kill only a relatively small proportion of the planet.” Ditto pandemics, “even at their more virulent.”

### Impact – Existential Risk Outweighs

#### Combating existential risks outweighs other concerns.

Nick Bostrom, 2012 (philosopher @ the University of Oxford), WE'RE UNDERESTIMATING THE RISK OF HUMAN EXTINCTION. Mar. 6, 2012. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>

Nick Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

### Impact – Bias

#### AI will lead to bias against minority populations.

Mike Thomas, 2021 (staff reporter), BUILTIN. July 6, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/risks-of-artificial-intelligence>

Various forms of AI bias are detrimental, too. Speaking recently to the New York Times, Princeton computer science professor Olga Russakovsky said it goes well beyond gender and race. In addition to data and algorithmic bias (the latter of which can “amplify” the former), AI is developed by humans and humans are inherently biased. “A.I. researchers are primarily people who are male, who come from certain racial demographics, who grew up in high socioeconomic areas, primarily people without disabilities,” Russakovsky said. “We’re a fairly homogeneous population, so it’s a challenge to think broadly about world issues.” In the same article, Google researcher Timnit Gebru said the root of bias is social rather than technological, and called scientists like herself “some of the most dangerous people in the world, because we have this illusion of objectivity.” The scientific field, she noted, “has to be situated in trying to understand the social dynamics of the world, because most of the radical change happens at the social level.”

#### Use of AI leads to racial bias and sexism.

Ulrike Franke, 2021 (Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations), ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI. Jan. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/

Machine-learning systems are those that use computing power to execute algorithms that learn from data. This means that AI is only as good as the algorithm it uses and the data it is being trained on. If, for example, the data is incomplete or biased, the AI trained on it will be equally biased. AI researchers around the world, and especially researchers from minority groups, have raised the alarm about this particular risk, which has already materialised in several cases. In the US, a risk assessment tool used in Florida's criminal justice system labelled African-American defendants as "high risk" at nearly twice the rate as white defendants. A hiring algorithm used at Amazon penalised applicants from women's colleges, while a chatbot trained on Twitter interactions started to post racist tweets. The concern is that real-life data fed into machine-learning systems perpetuate existing human biases, and that - as humans tend to consider computers to be rational - these biases will effectively be sanctioned, thereby entrenching prejudice further in society. Furthermore, AI trained on datasets collected in one cultural context and deployed in another cultural context might effectively enable cultural imperialism. In response to these concerns, big tech firms have developed principles and guidelines, and created research groups and divisions, on ethical AI. More recently, however, scandals have emerged over big tech employees reportedly being forced to leave their jobs for being too critical, heightening concerns that these companies are not taking the issue seriously enough.

### Impact – Economy

#### AI could crash the economy.

Mike Thomas, 2021 (staff reporter), BUILTIN. July 6, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/risks-of-artificial-intelligence>

Have you ever considered that algorithms could bring down our entire financial system? That’s right, Wall Street. You might want to take notice. Algorithmic trading could be responsible for our next major financial crisis in the markets. What is algorithmic trading? This type of trading occurs when a computer, unencumbered by the instincts or emotions that could cloud a human’s judgement, execute trades based off of pre-programmed instructions. These computers can make extremely high-volume, high-frequency and high-value trades that can lead to big losses and extreme market volatility. Algorithmic High-Frequency Trading (HFT) is proving to be a huge risk factor in our markets. HFT is essentially when a computer places thousands of trades at blistering speeds with the goal of selling a few seconds later for small profits. Thousands of these trades every second can equal a pretty hefty chunk of change. The issue with HFT is that it doesn’t take into account how interconnected the markets are or the fact that human emotion and logic still play a massive role in our markets. A sell-off of millions of shares in the airline market could potentially scare humans into selling off their shares in the hotel industry, which in turn could snowball people into selling off their shares in other travel-related companies, which could then affect logistics companies, food supply companies, etc. Take the “Flash Crash” of May 2010 as an example. Towards the end of the trading day, the Dow Jones plunged 1,000 points (more than $1 trillion in value) before rebounding towards normal levels just 36 minutes later. What caused this crash? A London-based trader named Navinder Singh Sarao first caused the crash and then it became exacerbated by HFT computers. Apparently Sarao used a “spoofing” algorithm that placed an order for thousands of stock index futures contracts betting that the market would fall. Instead of going through with the bet, Sarao was going to cancel the order at the last second and buy the lower priced stocks that were being sold off due to his original bet. Other humans and HFT computers saw this $200 million bet and took it as a sign that the market was going to tank. In turn, HFT computers began one of the biggest stock sell-offs in history, causing a brief loss of more than $1 trillion globally.

#### Economic Decline Risks World War III:

Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Vladimir Popov, 2/12/2019 (Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007 & Vladimir Popov, a former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin, “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War,” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/>, Retrieved 8/2/2021)

KUALA LUMPUR and BERLIN, Feb 12 2019 (IPS) - Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict. More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war. Crisis responses limited The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates. But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms. Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy. From bust to bubble Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression. As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy. The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign. International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition! Liberalization’s discontents Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened. Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization. Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality. To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries. Insecurity, populism, conflict Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern. Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts. Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse. At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies. Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers. They patently ignored Thucydides’ warning, in chronicling the Peloponnesian wars over two millennia before, when the rise of Athens threatened the established dominance of Sparta! Anticipating and addressing such possibilities may well serve to help avoid otherwise imminent disasters by undertaking pre-emptive collective action, as difficult as that may be. The international community has no excuse for being like the owners and captain of the Titanic, conceitedly convinced that no iceberg could possibly sink the great ship.

### Impact – Not Science Fiction

#### AI isn’t science fiction—it can spell the end of the human race.

Shaun Tan, 9/26/2017 (staff writer, “We Need an AI Limitation Treaty. Now.” <https://www.chinausfocus.com/society-culture/we-need-an-ai-limitation-treaty-now>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

For most, the threat of artificial intelligence seems like science fiction, the stuff of movies like I, Robot, The Matrix, and The Terminator. But the threat it poses is real. Prominent computer scientists have warned of it for years, and recently some of the smartest people on the planet have taken up the call. Bill Gates considers AI more dangerous than a nuclear catastrophe, Elon Musk said it was probably humanity’s “biggest existential threat,” Steven Hawking said it could “spell the end of the human race.”

#### Super-intelligent machines are not science fiction.

Robby Berman, 2021 (political analyst), THE FUTURE. Jan. 20, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://bigthink.com/the-future/superintelligent-ai-planck/>

“A super-intelligent machine that controls the world sounds like science fiction,” says paper co-author Manuel Cebrian in a press release. “But there are already machines that perform certain important tasks independently without programmers fully understanding how they learned it. The question therefore arises whether this could at some point become uncontrollable and dangerous for humanity.”

### Impact – Can’t Be Controlled

#### Safeguards around AI will fail.

Shaun Tan, 9/26/2017 (staff writer, “We Need an AI Limitation Treaty. Now.” <https://www.chinausfocus.com/society-culture/we-need-an-ai-limitation-treaty-now>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Others have suggested building safeguards around the AGI or superintelligence. They’ve mooted measures of varying degrees of complexity, from denying it access to the internet, to restricting its contact with the outside world, to trapping it in a series of concentric virtual worlds. None of these safeguards inspire confidence. First, as Roman V. Yampolskiy, Associate Professor of Computer Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Louisville, noted, every security measure ever invented has eventually been circumvented. “Signatures have been faked, locks have been picked, supermax prisons had escapes, guarded leaders have been assassinated, bank vaults have been cleaned out, laws have been bypassed…passwords have been brute-forced, networks have been penetrated, computers have been hacked, biometric systems have been spoofed, credit cards have been cloned, cryptocurrencies have been double spent…CAPTCHAs have been cracked, cryptographic protocols have been broken,” he wrote. “Millennia long history of humanity contains millions of examples of attempts to develop technological and logistical solutions to increase safety and security, yet not a single example exists which has not eventually failed.” Any safeguards would eventually be circumvented either by human hackers, or acts of nature (for example, the tsunami that caused the radiation leak at the Fukushima nuclear reactor). Whilst a certain failure rate may be acceptable in an enterprise where the stakes are lower, it’s unacceptable where a single leak might be all the AI needs to end humanity’s dominance.

#### Safeguards will be circumvented by the AI itself.

Shaun Tan, 9/26/2017 (staff writer, “We Need an AI Limitation Treaty. Now.” <https://www.chinausfocus.com/society-culture/we-need-an-ai-limitation-treaty-now>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Then, there’s the likelihood that any safeguards would be circumvented by the AI itself. Indeed, any security measures our best computer scientists could devise would be laughable to a superintelligence, which by definition would be many times smarter than any human. Imagine a human being held captive by chimpanzees. Suppose that these are unusually intelligent chimpanzees that use state-of-the-art monkey technology to keep the human prisoner – perhaps they manage to construct a rudimentary cage out of sticks. Is there any doubt that the human wouldn’t eventually escape in ways the chimpanzees couldn’t possibly think of? Perhaps he’d dig a hole under the cage, or fashion tools out of nearby objects to help him, or remove the bars of the cage and use them as weapons, or make a fire that burns down a portion of the cage. One way or another, it would only be a matter of time before he found a way free. A superintelligence would be smarter than humans in a similar fashion. In his article “Leakproofing the Singularity: Artificial Intelligence Confinement Problem,” Yampolskiy suggested that a superintelligence could easily manipulate a human guard into letting it escape. It could target a guard’s weaknesses, offering him power or immortality, or promising a cure for a loved-one with a terminal disease. It could also find a bug in the system and exploit it (something even human hackers do all the time). Or pretend to malfunction, and then escape when its jailors lower safeguards to investigate. Or it could escape in ways humans aren’t even aware are possible. Insulated from the outside world, Bostrom suggested, it might find a way to generate radio waves by shuffling the electrons in its circuitry in particular patterns. Of course, these are just the methods our puny human brains can imagine – an entity thousands of times smarter would be able to come up with a lot more. Effective safeguards are built around power – they’re not possible against a being that’s smarter, and therefore more powerful, than us. Thinking we could contain something like that would be hubris.

#### Attempts to control AI will backfire and risk extinction of the human race.

Manuel Alfonseca, et al, 2021 (Escuela Politécnica Superior, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain), JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/12202/26642>

Bostrom extensively discusses the weaknesses of the various mechanisms. He relies on sce-narios in which, short of rendering the AI useless, well-intentioned control mechanisms can easily backfire. As an illustrative example, a superintelligence given the task of “maximizing happiness in the world,” without deviating from its goal, might find it more efficient to destroy all life on earth and create faster-computerized simulations of happy thoughts. Likewise, a superintelligence con-trolled via an incentive method may not trust humans to deliver the promised reward, or may worry that the human operator could fail to recognize the achievement of the set goals.

#### AI risks human extinction and it can’t be controlled.

Mark Stockley, 2015 (writer for Sophos), ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COULD MAKE US EXTINCT, WARN OXFORD UNIVERSITY RESEARCHERS. Feb. 17, 2015. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/02/17/artificial-intelligence-could-make-us-extinct-warn-oxford-university-researchers/>

Researchers at Oxford University have produced the first list of global risks ‘that pose a threat to human civilisation, or even possibly to all human life.’ The report focuses on risks with ‘impacts that for all practical purposes can be called infinite’. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is on it. And while human extinction might be a horrific, accidental side effect of climate change, a metorite impact or a super volcano, the report warns that AI might decide to cause our extinction deliberately (my emphasis): ...extreme intelligences could not easily be controlled (either by the groups creating them, or by some international regulatory regime), and would probably act to boost their own intelligence and acquire maximal resources for almost all initial AI motivations. And if these motivations do not detail the survival and value of humanity, the intelligence will be driven to construct a world without humans. This makes extremely intelligent AIs a unique risk, in that extinction is more likely than lesser impacts. [ellipses in original].

#### AI designed to solve the world’s problems cannot be contained.

Manuel Alfonseca, et al, 2021 (Escuela Politécnica Superior, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain), JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/12202/26642>

Interestingly, reduced versions of the decidability problem have produced a fruitful area of re-search: formal verification, whose objective is to produce techniques to verify the correctness of computer programs and ensure they satisfy desirable properties (Vardi & Wolper, 1986). However, these techniques are only available to highly restricted classes of programs and inputs, and have been used in safety-critical applications such as train scheduling. But the approach of considering restricted classes of programs and inputs cannot be useful to the containment of superintelligence. Superintelligent machines, those Bostrom is interested in, are written in Turing-complete program¬ming languages, are equipped with powerful sensors, and have the state of the world as their input. This seems unavoidable if we are to program machines to help us with the hardest problems facing society, such as epidemics, poverty, and climate change. These problems forbid the limitations im¬posed by available formal verification techniques, rendering those techniques unusable at this grand scale.

#### Efforts to contain rogue AI are impossible.

Robby Berman, 2021 (political analyst), THE FUTURE. Jan. 20, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://bigthink.com/the-future/superintelligent-ai-planck/>

The most obvious way to keep a super intelligent AI from getting ahead of us is to limit its access to information by preventing it from connecting to the internet. The problem with limiting access to information, though, is that it would make any problem we assign the AI more difficult for it to solve. We would be weakening its problem-solving promise possibly to a point of uselessness. The second approach that might be taken is to limit what a super-intelligent AI is capable of doing by programming into it certain boundaries. This might be akin to writer Isaac Asimov’s Laws of Robotics, the first of which goes: “A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.” Unfortunately, says the study, a series of logical tests reveal that it’s impossible to create such limits. Any such a containment algorithm, it turns out, would be self-defeating. “If you break the problem down to basic rules from theoretical computer science, it turns out that an algorithm that would command an AI not to destroy the world could inadvertently halt its own operations. If this happened, you would not know whether the containment algorithm is still analyzing the threat, or whether it has stopped to contain the harmful AI. In effect, this makes the containment algorithm unusable.” The team investigated stacking containment algorithms, with each monitoring the behavior of the previous one, but eventually the same problem arises: The final check halts itself, rendering it unreliable.

#### Humans can’t compete with artificial superintelligence.

Ben Ashman, 2019 (multimedia journalist), WHEN AI GOES WRONG: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN MACHINES GO ROGUE? July 24, 2019. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://tbtech.co/innovativetech/artificial-intelligence/what-happens-when-ai-goes-wrong/>

Artificial superintelligence (ASI) has the potential to be incredibly powerful and poses many questions as to how we appropriately manage it. In an interview with the BBC, Stephen Hawking said that ASI would “take off on its own, and re-design itself at an ever-increasing rate. Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, couldn’t compete and would be superseded.”

#### It is impossible to contain a rogue AI.

Manuel Alfonseca, et al, 2021 (Escuela Politécnica Superior, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain), JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/12202/26642>

Superintelligence is a hypothetical agent that possesses intelligence far surpassing that of the brightest and most gifted human minds. In light of recent advances in machine intelligence, a num-ber of scientists, philosophers and technologists have revived the discussion about the potentially catastrophic risks entailed by such an entity. In this article, we trace the origins and development of the neo-fear of superintelligence, and some of the major proposals for its containment. We argue that total containment is, in principle, impossible, due to fundamental limits inherent to comput¬ing itself. Assuming that a superintelligence will contain a program that includes all the programs that can be executed by a universal Turing machine on input potentially as complex as the state of the world, strict containment requires simulations of such a program, something theoretically (and practically) impossible.

#### Artificial Intelligence can’t be controlled.

Robby Berman, 2021 (political analyst), THE FUTURE. Jan. 20, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://bigthink.com/the-future/superintelligent-ai-planck/>

Artificial intelligence that's smarter than us could potentially solve problems beyond our grasp. AI that are self-learning can absorb whatever information they need from the internet, a Pandora's Box if ever there was one. The nature of computing itself prevents us from limiting the actions of a super-intelligent AI if it gets out of control.

#### A super-intelligent AI is uncontrollable.

Robby Berman, 2021 (political analyst), THE FUTURE. Jan. 20, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://bigthink.com/the-future/superintelligent-ai-planck/>

There have been a fair number of voices—Stephen Hawking among them—raised in warning that a super-intelligent artificial intelligence could one day turn on us and that we shouldn’t be in such a hot, unquestioning hurry to develop true AI. Others say, naw, don’t worry. Now a new white paper from scientists at the Center for Humans and Machines at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development presents a series of theoretical tests that confirm the threat: Due to the basic concepts underlying computing, we would be utterly unable to control a super-intelligent AI. “We argue that total containment is, in principle, impossible, due to fundamental limits inherent to computing itself,” write the paper’s authors.

#### Superintelligence is not controllable.

Manuel Alfonseca, et al, 2021 (Escuela Politécnica Superior, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain), JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/12202/26642>

A superintelligence poses a fundamentally different problem than those typically studied under the banner of “robot ethics”. This is because a superintelligence is multi-faceted, and therefore potentially capable of mobilizing a diversity of resources in order to achieve objectives that are potentially incomprehensible to humans, let alone controllable.

#### AI will evolve beyond our control.

Mark Stockley, 2015 (writer for Sophos), ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COULD MAKE US EXTINCT, WARN OXFORD UNIVERSITY RESEARCHERS. Feb. 17, 2015. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/02/17/artificial-intelligence-could-make-us-extinct-warn-oxford-university-researchers/>

AI is included, along with nanotechnology and synthetic biology, in a category of emerging risks. The emerging risks are poorly understood but also have the potential to solve many of the other problems on the list. The threat of AI comes from its potential to run away from us – it’s just possible that AI will end up working on itself and evolve beyond our understanding and control.

#### AI decision-making is more difficult to challenge.

Ulrike Franke, 2021 (Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations), ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI. Jan. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/

Related to concerns about bias are those about the transparency of how AI works. Employing machine-learning methods means that systems are no longer programmed - namely, told what to do by human beings - but instead learn how to behave either by themselves or under human supervision. It is difficult for a human to understand and track how an AI-enabled system has reached a conclusion. This makes it hard to challenge AI-enabled decisions, and to tell whether malicious actors have exploited the vulnerabilities of AI systems.

### Impact – Don’t Build It In the First Place

#### The best way to stop AI is to not build it in the first place.

Kai Kupferschmidt, 2018 (contributing correspondent for Science magazine), SCIENCE. Jan. 11, 2018. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://www.science.org/content/article/could-science-destroy-world-these-scholars-want-save-us-modern-day-frankenstein>

Pinker thinks the scenarios reveal more about human obsessions than real risks. We are drawn to prospects "that are highly improbable while having big impacts on our fitness, such as illicit sex, violent death, and Walter-Mittyish feats of glory," he writes. "Apocalyptic storylines are undoubtedly gripping—they are a supernormal stimulus for our morbid obsessions." Sure, he says, one can imagine a malevolent, powerful AI that people can no longer control. "The way to deal with this threat is straightforward: Don't build one." Tallinn argues it's better to be safe than sorry. A 2017 survey showed that 34% of AI experts believed the risks associated with their work are an important problem; 5% said they are "one of the most important problems." "Imagine you're on a plane, and 40% of experts think that there is a bomb on this plane," Tallinn says. "You're not going to wait for the remaining experts to be convinced."

#### The development of AI leads to an AI arms race around the globe—the best hope is to stop it in its tracks.

Mike Thomas, 2021 (staff reporter), BUILTIN. July 6, 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from <https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/risks-of-artificial-intelligence>

Not everyone agrees with Musk that AI is more dangerous than nukes, including Ford. But what if AI decides to launch nukes — or, say, biological weapons — sans human intervention? Or, what if an enemy manipulates data to return AI-guided missiles whence they came? Both are possibilities. And both would be disastrous. The more than 30,000 AI/robotics researchers and others who signed an open letter on the subject in 2015 certainly think so. “The key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting,” they wrote. “If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable, and the endpoint of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. Unlike nuclear weapons, they require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce. It will only be a matter of time until they appear on the black market and in the hands of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control their populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing, etc. Autonomous weapons are ideal for tasks such as assassinations, destabilizing nations, subduing populations and selectively killing a particular ethnic group. We therefore believe that a military AI arms race would not be beneficial for humanity. There are many ways in which AI can make battlefields safer for humans, especially civilians, without creating new tools for killing people.”

#### An AI arms race leads to World War III.

Lyle J. Goldstein, 2/1/2019 (Research Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the United States Naval War College, “China's Olive Branch to Save the World from AI Weapons,” <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-olive-branch-save-world-ai-weapons-42972>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Unlike most defense analysts, who are content to passively observe this process, these authors contend that the intensifying arms race in lethal AI systems constitutes a “Pandora’s box [魔盒]” that could lead the world to “the apocalypse [终结时代].” Great Western thinkers and innovators from Stephen Hawking [霍金] to Elon Musk [马斯克] are cited. It is indeed noted that Musk warned in fall 2017 that an AI arms race could even be the spark for World War III. Western experts may smirk at a Chinese argument that involves discussion of human rights, but Xu and Ge articulate concern that targeted killings by drones violate a “person’s right to a fair trial.” Moreover, they view the characteristics of such robotic systems as lacking in emotion or ethical reasoning and having “psychological distance [心里的距离]” that will lead invariably to “massacres and such humanitarian disasters [滥杀等人道主义灾难].” Illustrating the important point that Chinese defense scientists are also increasingly perturbed by the possibility escalation in an AI strategic environment, Xu and Ge evince the concern that AI weaponry “significantly lowers the threshold of war [这极大降低了战争的门槛].”

### Impact – Cooperation on Ethical AI Will Fail

#### Transatlantic cooperation on the ethical use of AI will fail.

Ulrike Franke, 2021 (Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations), ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI. Jan. 2021. Retrieved May 18, 2022 from https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/

Like-minded democratic states share an interest in guaranteeing that AI is developed and used in accordance with liberal democratic values. Both the US and Europe say they want to ensure that everyone can benefit equally from AI, and that competition does not create incentives that lead to an undercutting of standards. However, despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on ethical AI may not be as easy as it first appears.

## Politics Disadvantage

### Politics DA Link – 1NC

#### There are political hurdles to effective interoperability of AI in NATO.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” [https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/ 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/%2010.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69), Retrieved 6/11/2022)

On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.